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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the theories of international intervention into ethnic conflict.  
The two case studies utilized to evaluate the interventionist literature are the Islamic 
separatist movements of Thailand and the Philippines.  Both insurgencies are 
characterized by domestic attempts at secularization, marginalization, forced 
assimilation, and repression, causing ethno-religious minorities to violently attempt to 
separate from the state.  While insurgencies are nothing new to Southeast Asia, the 
conflicts in the Philippines and Thailand were redefined by the War on Terror.  Both 
countries became peripheral symbols of the broader international effort against militant 
Islamism.  As a result, external actors took a vested interest in the evolution of each 
conflict.  Strangely, the international or regional actors with parallel interests in each 
conflict have adopted divergent approaches in their involvement with activities in the two 
countries.  The United States, Malaysia, and Al Qaeda seem to have equally vested 
interests in each conflict, and yet the extensive intervention in the Philippines is offset by 
a lack of intervention in Thailand.  In the end, this comparison will offer insights into 
how domestic and international interests affect intervention, and the resulting 
implications for regional stability in Southeast Asia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Most ethnic conflicts occur within state boundaries, but few remain entirely 
domestic.  Causal explanations commonly analyze how the historical identities of 
domestic actors translate into ethno-religious or ethno-nationalist political movements 
without regard to the interests and influences of neighboring states or regional 
organizations.  When external actors intervene, domestic explanations of the conflict are 
rendered incomplete.  Scholarship must then determine how and why external 
intervention occurred, providing a more complete analysis of the dynamics of ethnic 
conflict. 
The Muslim insurgents in the Philippines and Thailand have long troubled their 
governments and affected people’s lives.  These ethno-religious minorities share similar 
histories to include forced assimilation, secularization, political marginalization, and 
repression.  While insurgencies are nothing new to Southeast Asia, the conflicts in the 
Philippines and Thailand were redefined by the war on terror.  Both countries became 
peripheral symbols of the broader international effort against militant Islamism.  As a 
result, external actors took a vested interest in the evolution of each conflict.  Strangely, 
the international or regional actors with parallel interests in each conflict have adopted 
divergent approaches in their involvement with activities in the Philippines compared to 
southern Thailand. 
This thesis analyzes why significant international intervention has occurred in the 
Philippines but not in Thailand.  Both nations are major non-NATO allies of the United 
States, illustrating the proximity of interests between Bangkok, Manila, and Washington.  
As the United States pursued a global struggle against Islamic extremism, the strategic 
agendas of the United States, Philippines, and Thailand seemed to align.  However, the 
United States has contributed enormous financial and military assets to the Philippines 
yet remains uninvolved in Thailand.  Similarly, the terrorist groups of Al Qaeda and 
Jemaah Islamiyah have significant ties to Philippine insurgents but very limited 
 2
interaction with Thai insurgents.  On the regional level, Malaysia has taken an active role 
in peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but has taken no definitive action to alleviate the 
explosive situation in neighboring Thailand.   The reasons for which each of these 
external actors intervened in the Philippines appear equally applicable in Thailand, yet 
the reality remains significantly different.  This thesis will attempt to explain these 
disparities. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This research effort offers a fresh comparative look at the theories of international 
intervention into ethnic conflict as it applies to the Philippines and Thailand.  Existing 
literatures examine both insurgencies, but no recent effort explains the extensive 
intervention in the Philippines and the apparent international indifference towards 
Thailand.  In the end, this comparison will offer new insights into how domestic and 
international interests affect intervention, and the resulting implications for regional 
stability in Southeast Asia. 
U.S. policy towards the Philippines carries on the close relationship maintained 
between the two countries.  Joint military exercises continue against Abu Sayyaf 
insurgents.  American and Philippine forces have expanded counterinsurgency operations 
countrywide, mobilized by $70 million in U.S. Foreign Military Financing between 2004 
and 2006.  The Philippines received $2.7 million in 2004 from the International Military 
and Education and Training Program, the largest sum of any Asian country.  USAID 
assisted the Philippine government in directing $23.2 million intended to heal tensions of 
conflict, improve the livelihoods for former combatants, and rehabilitate the economic 
conditions in poverty stricken Mindanao.  Bilateral relations remain solid, anchored by 
Manila’s loyal support of Washington’s war on terrorism.  President Bush designated the 
Philippines a major non-NATO ally in October 2003, and was among the initial countries 
to sign all 12 United Nations counterterrorism conventions.1 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Philippines,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm (accessed April 27, 2007).   
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Washington’s traditionally close relationship with Thailand, another major non-
NATO ally, has been strained since the September 2006 coup.  Negotiations for a free 
trade agreement, which began in 2004, were suspended following the seizure of power.  
Funding for the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military 
Financing programs, which in conjunction with various other programs totaled $29 
million, was also halted.  While American forces assumed a leading role in Philippine 
counter-insurgency operations, they have remained distant from the deteriorating 
situation in southern Thailand.  Thailand nonetheless provided troops in support of the 
Iraq war in 2003 despite the protests of domestic Muslim constituencies, and remains a 
strategic ally critical to security and stability in the region.2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Causes of Intervention 
Academic explanations of foreign intervention in ethnic conflict vary widely.  
Motivations can be altruistic or defensive, opportunistic or diplomatic.  Intervention can 
occur in two ways.  First, activities on the national level can have effects or consequences 
on the international level.  In this case, the ethnic conflict creates a situation which draws 
international attention and action.  Conversely, events on the international level may 
influence the conduct of national conflict, thereby “lending ethnic conflict an 
international character.”3 
2. Inaction or Indifference 
While seemingly counter-intuitive, determining why intervention occurs does not 
automatically explain why intervention does not occur.  “Inaction” must be carefully 
distinguished from “indifference,” and requires explanation when taking the shape of 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Thailand,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm (accessed April 27, 2007). 
3 Rajat Ganguly and Raymond C. Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 
(New York: Longman, 1998): 68. 
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“indirect intervention.”4  The actions of the United States, Malaysia, and international 
terrorist organizations deserve scrutiny in their differing approaches to the Philippines 
and Thailand.  Having entered its third year, Thailand’s southern insurgency “dwarfs any 
other conflict in Southeast Asia” according to area expert Zachary Abuza.5   Despite the 
compelling arguments which could justify external intervention, the conflict appears to 
remain entirely domestic.  Thus, inaction as a deliberate policy deserves explanation. 6 
3. Instrumental Intervention 
When intervention occurs, third party interests can normally be identified and 
explained.   In their 1977 work titled Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Astri 
Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble categorized motivations as “instrumental or affective.”7  
Instrumental intervention is founded upon realist motivations in which external 
participation is driven by international political considerations, economic motivations, or 
domestic objectives.8  Underlying factors may be opportunistically exploitative,9 or 
defensively containing,10 but the “dynamic of the broader conflict is largely unrelated to 
the ethnic dimensions of the initial conflict.”11  Conflicts that generate rising levels of 
internal violence are more likely to attract external mediation intended to stabilize the 
situation and prevent its development into a wider regional conflict.     
                                                 
4 Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds., Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977): 16. 
5 Zachary Abuza, “Wake Up Call: Six Months After the Thai Coup, Islamist Insurgency is Raging,” 
Counterterrorism Blog, comment posted on March 20, 2007,   
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/three_years_after_january_2004.php (accessed April 27, 2007). 
6 Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 16.  The explanation of “inaction as a 
deliberate policy” receives no explanation and contains no supporting evidence within Suhrke and Noble’s 
research.  In fact, the reference to “inaction” only occurs in a brief footnote. 
7 Ibid., 226. 
8 Realism is a theory utilized in the discipline of international relations.  It assumes that the 
international system is anarchic and comprised of self-interested states that are inherently suspicious of one 
another and willing to forcefully defend national sovereignty.  
9 Michael E. Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in The International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996): 
597. 
10 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Limited, 1995): 68. 
11 Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 12. 
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Instrumental approaches broadly shaped U.S. policies towards the Philippines and 
Thailand.  Both the Philippine and Thai domestic situations remain troubled by militant 
Islamists seeking various level of autonomy or separatism.  Despite the commonalities 
between the two conflicts, American military forces participate directly in Philippine 
counter-terrorism operations, yet in Thailand, where insurgent activity is much more 
extreme, U.S. participation is limited to intelligence collaboration.  Why do such large 
policy differences exist towards the only major non-NATO allies in Southeast Asia?  Is 
the explanation purely instrumental, or are other factors shaping American policy? 
4. Affective Intervention 
Affective intervention is inspired by cross boundary ethnic loyalties.  The 
potential for heightened levels of violence and international instability grow “for reasons 
directly related to ethnicity.  Interventionist policies shaped by affective motivations are 
driven by calls for justice, humanitarian assistance, ethnic, religious, racial or ideological 
affinity with one of the disputants, or even personal friendships between top 
protagonists.”12  State boundaries separating ethnically homogenous communities also 
increase the likelihood of external intervention.13  Groups sharing a common language, 
religion, and culture but separated by international borders are likely to align when one of 
the members is engaged in an ethnic dispute.  These actions cannot be labeled 
“defensive,” though interveners often use “defense” as their justification for the 
intrusion.14  The stronger the historical ties, the more likely support will be provided.   
Analyses of the Thai insurgency often include descriptions of the ethnic kinship 
between southern Thai Muslims and the Malaysian population.  Thai Muslims originally 
sought irredentist support from bordering Malaysia, but when official support was 
limited, Thai Muslims instead pursued independence.  While Kuala Lumpur’s official 
policy remains anchored on non-interference, the affective connection between the two 
                                                 
12 Alexis Heraclides, The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank 
Cass, 1991): 52. 
13 Ganguly and Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 42; Ryan, Ethnic 
Conflict and International Relations, 54; Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 12. 
14 Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” 597. 
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communities fuels considerable tension and suspicion in Bangkok.  The common ethnic 
heritage also forces the national leadership in Malaysia to carefully balance domestics 
and international politics.  Overt support for Thai Muslims could weaken Malaysia’s 
regional credibility relating to norms of sovereignty, while inaction could unsettle its 
Muslim populous.  Affective considerations are not limited to the border region.  As the 
chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia’s response to 
Thailand’s Muslim insurgency is magnified within the global Muslim community.  With 
Thailand’s cycle of violence escalating, how long will Malaysia be willing to risk 
spillover of Thailand’s conflict?  How long can Malaysia gamble that Thai insurgents 
will not seek fundamentalist support in order to create a pure Islamic state in the border 
region?  
Affective motivations must be considered when evaluating Manila’s decision to 
invite American forces back to the Philippines under the guise of counter-terrorism in 
2001.  The GRP has been at war with Muslim insurgents since 1972.  At that time, the 
United States maintained a robust navy and air force presence in the Philippines.  The 
ongoing insurgency did not prevent Manila from closing the American naval and air 
bases there in 1991, after which Manila was considered to have shed the lingering patron-
colony relationship with Washington.  Why then did Manila resurrect the close military 
relationship with the United States following September 11, 2001?  Was Washington’s 
ambition to root out Islamic insurgents identified by the Christian dominated government 
in Manila as an opportunity to be exploited?  Or were Philippine forces overwhelmed and 
in need of assistance against a renewed separatist offensive? 
International terrorist groups also exploit religious affiliation to create global 
partnerships among militant Islamists.  The tactic worked in the Philippines, where Al 
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah networked with local insurgents.  The alliance provided 
Philippine separatists with significant financial and military resources and created an 
opportunity for Southeast Asian jihadis to collaborate.  The arrangement expanded 
terrorism’s operational reach in the region while at the same time increasing capabilities 
through knowledge sharing and combined training opportunities.  Thai insurgents, 
however, have not capitalized on the assets solicited by these same international 
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terrorists.  No serious accusations have been made and little hard evidence has been 
gathered connecting Thai insurgents with international terrorists.  So far, Thailand has 
only served as a meeting place for organization and coordination.  Understanding why 
international terrorists have not exploited their ideological commonality with Thai 
insurgents is critical in dissecting the insurgency.  As both the Philippine and Thai 
conflicts strengthen the Islamist agenda and undermine western interests in the region, 
how can the literature explain the robust assistance to Philippine fighters and the 
exclusion of Thai insurgents? 
5. Sovereignty and Self-determination 
Both supporters and opponents of intervention can marshal international laws or 
norms to their advantage.  For example, the debate between sovereignty and self-
determination highlights an interesting intersection of instrumental and affective 
motivations.  Instrumentalists emphasize the threatening international environment in 
which state building occurs, while proponents of affective support describe the state 
building process as the fundamental reason that ethnic minorities rebel.  “Self-
determination is the central expression of the [affective] position on ethnic minority 
struggle against state building.”15  As a result, the struggle between sovereignty and self 
determination receives considerable attention throughout the literature as a primary 
source of tension and violence.16 
The degree to which territorial integrity is threatened dictates the likelihood of 
instrumental intervention by supporters of the nation-state system.  The principle of self-
determination has been emphasized in policy statements and declarations to include the 
1941 Atlantic Charter, Articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter; in the 1966 
Human Rights Covenants, and in Article 8 of the Helsinki Final Act.17  Groups that have 
utilized these documents to legitimate their own self-determination efforts include Sinn 
                                                 
15 David Carment and Patrick James, Wars in the Midst of Peace (University of Pittsburgh Press: 
Pittsburgh, PA): 260. 
16 Ganguly and Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension,42; Ryan, Ethnic 
Conflict and International Relations, 54; Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 12.  
17 Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 54. 
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Fein, the PLO, Tamil Tigers, and Turkish Cypriots.  The hesitancy of nation-states to 
recognize such claims of self-determination is understandable, as it directly challenges 
states’ rights regarding sovereignty.  As such, the right of self-determination threatens the 
doctrine of sovereignty and attracts international scrutiny.  Other nation-states are a 
natural ally of sovereign governments mired in domestic territorial disputes or 
secessionist activities, as both parties benefit by defending the legitimacy of the state 
system.  Secessionists, who directly challenge the legitimacy of the state, then balance 
against the state’s international support by seeking outside proponents of self 
determination.18 
Malaysia shares a complex history of sovereignty disputes with both the 
Philippines and Thailand.  While tensions with Thailand are the result of the porous 
border region and alleged Malaysian support for Thai separatists, bilateral disputes with 
the Philippines center on territorial disagreements surrounding the Borneo state of Sabah 
and the Spratly Islands.  Despite the strained relationship between Kuala Lumpur and 
Manila, GRP officials invited Malaysian diplomats to mediate a settlement between 
insurgents and the GRP.  The inherent irony is that Malaysia, weighted by its long 
standing territorial disputes with the Philippines, assists in mediating a settlement aimed 
at maintaining Philippine sovereignty.  Malaysia extended the same deal of mediation 
recently to Bangkok, who quickly declined the offer.  Can Malaysia really act as a neutral 
mediator in either conflict?  Can Malaysia legitimately recommend autonomy for its 
Muslim brethren?  Or will Malaysian officials support sovereignty as indicated by the 
literature?  Malaysia’s leadership will certainly be scrutinized by its domestic Muslim 
population at home as well as the OIC.  The impact of Malaysia’s mediation cannot be 
underestimated. 
6. Terrorism and Refugees 
Rajat Ganguly and Raymond Taras add discussions of international terrorism and 
refugee flows.  First, they suggest that ethno-nationalists utilize international terrorism as 
an instrument for elevating a domestic conflict into the international arena.  Ethnic 
                                                 
18 Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 12. 
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protagonists lacking the resources to engage in conventional warfare often resort to 
terrorism.  The tactic as part of a larger political goal is inexpensive and highly visible, 
quickly drawing international attention through globalized media sources.  Due to the 
geographic orientation of both the Philippine and Thai insurgencies, international 
terrorism remains minimal.  In the Philippines, insurgents have attacked targets in Manila 
and other Christian dominated sections of the country.  However, in Thailand, terrorist 
attacks have been largely isolated to the southern provinces.  Does the spread of attacks 
outside Muslim dominated areas in the Philippines explain the varied levels of 
international intervention? 
Refugee flows internationalize conflicts by the massive flow of people from one 
state into another.  This situation may cause the receiving state to condemn the actions of 
its neighbor’s domestic situation which could destabilize the regional order or even lead 
to war.19  In 2005, 131 Thai Muslims sought safe-haven in Malaysia, hoping to find 
refuge from the “harsh and indiscriminate persecution” reportedly imposed on Muslims 
by Thai authorities.  Instead of repatriating the alleged militants at Bangkok’s request, 
Kuala Lumpur allowed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
to interview and screen the group.  The effort was viewed by Bangkok as overt 
interference.  Since then, only one of the 131 refugees has been returned to Thailand.  
Should violence continue to dominate southern Thailand, the possibility of continued 
refugee flows remains.  The geographic construction of the Philippines is the only reason 
that refugee flows have not resulted in an enormous humanitarian effort there.  The 
Philippine conflict has created more than 500,000 refugees since 1972. 
7. The Effects of Intervention 
The literature overwhelmingly concludes that intervention by third parties into 
domestic conflicts negatively affects prospects for peace.20  External support for one of 
                                                 
19 Ganguly and Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 68. 
20 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International 
Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (1996): 42; 
Carment and James, Wars in the Midst of Peace, 260; Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 
65; Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” 328.  
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the groups increases the level of violence and limits the likelihood of a political 
settlement.  Examples include Serbian support of Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia, 
Indian assistance for Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, and Iranian arming of Kurdish rebels in 
Iraq.21  In each case, intervention decreased the probability of political compromise and 
increased the intensity of fighting simply by prolonging the conflict and enabling 
“weaker powers to challenge the stronger.”22 
Instrumental motivations are commonly perceived as “exploitative and lacking 
sensitivity to local issues.  Sides may be taken and new issues introduced to the 
conflict.”23  If intervention is driven by affective stimulus, then third party participation is 
viewed as biased towards one side, costing the third party credibility and legitimacy in its 
effort.24  In either case, intervention often results in counter intervention, producing the 
kind of security dilemma that escalates, rather than de-escalates conflicts.  Evidence of 
such activity was witnessed in Lebanon, where Syrian and Israeli participation 
complicated the conflict, in Cyprus when Greek and Turkish forces resulted in the “de 
facto partitioning of the state,” and in the Angolan Civil war in which South African 
intervention was countered by Cuban support for the Marxist government.25  
The conflicts in southern Thailand and the Philippines provide interesting case 
studies in evaluating this body of literature as well.  Southern Thailand has experienced 
little to no external intervention, as officials in Bangkok and insurgents have both labored 
to keep the conflict domestic.  In the Philippines, however, intervention has occurred on 
both sides.  The United States supported the Philippine government economically and 
militarily, while international terrorist organizations provided training, materials, and 
financial resources for Moro insurgent activity.  Nonetheless, a peace process has been 
established in the Philippines, with the recent signing of a cease-fire agreement.  
                                                 
21 Brown, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,” in The 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1996): 328. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 65. 
24 Ganguly and Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 117. 
25 Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 65. 
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Meanwhile, the insurgency in Thailand continues to fester with little hope of relief in the 
near future.  This comparison allows a balanced evaluation of the literature in attempting 
to determine where current explanations fail in explanatory capability. 
8. Conclusion 
The war on terrorism has transformed both southern Thailand and the southern 
Philippines from traditional separatist movements motivated by narrow ethno-political 
objectives to conflicts representing the interests of much larger international 
constituencies.  As the “second front” in the war on terrorism, these insurgencies became 
symbols of the struggle between Islamists and the west.26  As both conflicts affect 
regional stability, understanding why regional and international actors have pursued 
interventionist policies in only one contributes to the larger understanding of conflict 
intervention. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Determining whether domestic conditions or international pressures provide the 
primary motivation for action is difficult given the subtle and fluid nature of Southeast 
Asian politics.  Research will nonetheless attempt to demonstrate what international 
factors influence each conflict, and then analyze the effects of international influences on 
the domestic situations.  Understandably, this does not suggest influences are one way.  
Care will be given to account for domestic conditions which cause international 
intervention, as well as interventionist activity which influences domestic conditions.  
Particular emphasis will be given to post-9/11 activities due to the widely controversial 
perspectives garnered by violent Muslim activities; however, historical trends in 
intervention will be framed in an effort to put international influences into context. 
Primary source documentation of domestic policies which can be positively 
linked to intervention will be valuable; otherwise, this study will consist largely of 
                                                 
26 President George W. Bush, speaking for the State of the Union Address, on January 29, 2002.  
President Bush referenced the War on Terror’s expansion to other fronts and identified the Philippines as 
an example.  Southeast Asia thus became the “second front” of the war. 
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secondary sources.  Scholarly articles, international think-tanks, and the Congressional 
Research Service provide recent analyses of the situations in both countries.  News 
articles and press releases will provide the most current reports on activities relating to 
peace negotiations or violent activity. 
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II. THAILAND 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THAILAND’S MUSLIM INSURGENCY 
After more than forty years of ineffective separatist activities, the Muslim 
insurgency in Thailand’s southern provinces stormed back into action in 2004.  The 
insurgents have been more successful than ever in their efforts to destabilize the country, 
arguably presenting the greatest risk to the regional stability of Southeast Asia.  Insurgent 
efforts have severely degraded Thailand’s political and economic situation, contributing 
to the motivations for the military coup against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and 
caused the deaths of more than 2,300 people in three years.   
Having entered its third year, Thailand’s southern insurgency “dwarfs any other 
conflict in Southeast Asia” according to area expert Zachary Abuza.27  Despite the 
compelling arguments which could justify external intervention, the conflict appears to 
remain entirely domestic.  The international actors with the most at stake, namely 
Malaysia, the United States, and international terrorist organizations, each have vested 
interests in Thailand’s future yet remain clear of interventionist policies.  Furthermore, 
each has motivations addressed by the literature on external intervention which suggests 
that the situation in Thailand warrants some form of intervention. 
This chapter will analyze factors affecting Thailand’s relationship with each.  
Analysis first explores the ethnic kinship between Malay Muslims and Thai Muslims, and 
how this relationship intersects with the broader political realities faced by Kuala Lumpur 
to produce policies averse to intervention.  Secondly, Thai relations with the United 
States will be examined.  Washington persuaded Bangkok to change its resistant posture 
to the Global War on Terror and adopt a more proactive and cooperative international 
position.  Thaksin’s decision was rewarded with the designation of major non-NATO 
ally, joining the Philippines as the only other major non-NATO ally the region. 
                                                 
27 Zachary Abuza, “Wake Up Call: Six Months After the Thai Coup, Islamist Insurgency is Raging,” 
Counterterrorism Blog, comment posted on March 20, 2007,   
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/three_years_after_january_2004.php (accessed April 27, 2007). 
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Ironically, both countries are home to violent Muslim insurgencies, and while United 
States intervened in the Philippines, it did not in Thailand.  Finally, this chapter analyzes 
why parallel objectives between Thai insurgents and international terrorist organizations 
have not led to closer cooperation. While increasingly sophisticated insurgent operations 
add to the suspicion of external terrorist assistance, no serious accusations have been 
made and little hard evidence has been gathered.  So far, Thailand has only served as a 
meeting place for organization and coordination.  Understanding why insurgents have not 
exploited their ideological commonality with global Islamists is critical in dissecting the 
insurgency. 
B. THAILAND AND MALAYSIA 
1. Ethnic Fault Lines 
Like many of the Southeast Asian border disputes, the origin of conflict between 
Thailand and Malaysia stretches back hundreds of years.  Thailand’s southern provinces, 
which border Malaysia, share a common religion, ethnicity, and language with the Malay 
Muslims to the south yet have been politically incorporated by Thailand since the late 
13th century.  Thai control over the Malay Peninsula was solidified in a 1909 treaty with 
the British when Thailand relinquished control of the Malay provinces of Kedah, 
Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu and retained the Malay Muslim dominated provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun.  “Although this resulted in the political segregation 
of the Malays, the broad cultural, commercial, and personal bonds between the Malay 
communities on either side of the border were sustained.”28 
The Muslims of southern Thailand view the border as artificial, and as such 
various organizations have led separatist and secessionist movements since the late 
1940s.  An opportunity to redraw the border followed World War II, and Thai Muslims 
pleaded with British officials to consider an adjustment which would unify Thai and 
Malaysian Muslims under the Federation of Malaya.  Sentiments were divided in 
                                                 
28 S.P. Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage: Investigating the Nature of Conflict in Southern 
Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28 no. 1 (2006): 51. 
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Malaysia. Officials in Kuala Lumpur distanced themselves from irredentist demands yet 
officials in Kelantan remained supportive of the Thai Muslim cause.29  The final British 
decision did not unify Muslim ethnic groups and maintained the international border 
separating Thai Muslims from their Malay kin.  Following the British decision, 
Kelantan’s dominant political party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), which had been 
overtly supportive of Thai Muslim’s right of self determination, tempered their support to 
expressions of “concern and sympathy.”30  Nonetheless, suspicion festered in Bangkok 
that PAS continued covert support for the active separatist groups in the region.31 
While PAS officials still dominate contemporary politics in Kelantan, the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) maintains control over the national government.  
As a result, the Thai situation provides an excellent opportunity for PAS leadership to 
criticize rival UMNO for its own political benefit.  PAS officials commonly reference the 
oppressed Muslims of southern Thailand, appealing to the ethnic kinship between Malay 
and Thai Muslims in protesting official Malaysian inaction.  UNMO leadership, 
constrained by international norms, is subtly accused of an unwillingness to help their 
Muslim “brethren” in Thailand.32  Malaysian domestic realities and political rhetoric feed 
Thailand’s suspicions of secretive partisan intervention. 
Tensions manifest themselves through troubled relationships between national 
level leaders.  For instance, when Thailand’s insurgent activity resumed in 2004, Thaksin 
requested Malaysia’s support in containing the conflict.  The Malaysian government 
attributed the unrest to poor socio-economic conditions in southern Thailand, and 
negotiated a Joint Development Strategy to “improve economic linkages between 
Thailand’s southern provinces and Malaysia’s more economically developed northern 
                                                 
29 Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 201.  Kelantan is the northernmost 
province in Malaysia and directly borders the Muslim dominated Thai provinces.  
30 Ibid., 202. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of 
Domestic and International Dimensions,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 540. 
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states.”33  When Thailand initiated its own brutal efforts to root out insurgents and 
inflamed extremist activity, Malaysia’s cooperative attitude diminished.  Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, was disturbed by Thailand’s strategy and expressed 
concern that the conflict could spread into his country.  In response, Thaksin blamed 
Malaysia for creating an environment where insurgents could organize and claimed that 
the Thai insurgents were being trained in the Malaysian jungles of Kelantan.34  
Further complicating bilateral relations is Malaysia’s role as the Chairman of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a position Malaysia filled from 2003 to 
2006.35  In 2005, the world’s largest Islamic organization expressed concern over the 
violent methods employed by Thai forces in the southern provinces.  The widely 
publicized criticism again met with a contemptuous and defensive Thaksin, who claimed 
the statement was inappropriate and a violation of Thai sovereignty.  The OIC was split 
in its support for Thai efforts.  Indonesia, Bahrain, Pakistan, Yemen, and Bangladesh 
maintained support for Thailand, yet Malaysia remained an outspoken opponent of 
Thailand’s police actions.  Subsequently, Thailand sent a delegation to OIC headquarters 
in Riyadh “to explain the country’s position” and lobby for support from Muslim 
leadership.36  Thai representatives succeeded in ensuring that a “conservatively worded 
report” on the Thai conflict emerged from the meeting, but did so without the support of 
Malaysian representatives.37  Some analysts allege that Malaysia is utilizing sympathy 
for Muslims in southern Thailand to “curry favor in the wider Muslim world.”38 
The height of tensions between Thailand and Malaysia occurred in August 2005 
when 131 Thai Muslims sought safe-haven in Malaysia, hoping to find refuge from the 
“harsh and indiscriminate persecution” reportedly imposed on Muslims by Thai 
                                                 
33 Ian Storey, “Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Southern Insurgency,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 5 
(March 2007): 7. 
34 Storey, “Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Southern Insurgency,” 7. 
35 Claudia Derichs, “Malaysia in 2005,” Asian Survey 47, no.1 (January/February 2006):173. 
36 Jeerawat Na Thalang and Don Pathan, “Non-interference under the microscope,” The Nation (July 
25, 2005). 
37 Michael Vatikiotis, “Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Domestic Challenges and 
Regional Perspectives,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): 40. 
38 Ibid. 
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authorities.39  Instead of repatriating the alleged militants at Bangkok’s request, Kuala 
Lumpur allowed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
interview and screen the group.  The effort was viewed by Bangkok as overt interference.  
Since then, only one of the 131 refugees has been returned to Thailand.  Since 2004, 
more than half of the casualties in southern Thailand have been Muslim, which could 
increase the likelihood of refugee flows into Malaysia.  Insurgents no longer limit attacks 
to Thai Buddhists, and instead execute anyone suspected of collaborating or 
sympathizing with state officials. Unless the Thai government can effectively protect 
innocent Muslims in its south, flows of refugees may increase. 
The language of Kelantan, Kuala Lumpur, and Malaysian OIC officials alike 
demonstrate lingering loyalties between Muslims in Malaysia and southern Thailand.  
While the official position of Kuala Lumpur is non-interference, considerations of 
domestic political survival, loyalty to the OIC, fear of refugees, and concern over Thai 
police actions create a litany of justifications for Malaysian interventionist policies. The 
dire situation for ethnic kin in southern Thailand complicates Malaysia’s ability to 
disassociate affective links from its international agenda. 
2. Malaysian Political Realities  
Historical precedents of bilateral cooperation counterbalance Malaysia’s ethnic 
and religious kinship with Thai Muslims.  Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Malaysian 
officials were mired in their own insurgency.  Kuala Lumpur depended upon Bangkok’s 
goodwill to defeat insurgent activity because the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), 
having been driven from Malaysia, operated from Thai territory.  Thai officials 
cooperated with Malaysian efforts to quell the communist insurgency, and in 1965 signed 
a bilateral border agreement allowing Malaysian security personnel to continue pursuit of 
insurgents into Thai territory.  Thai and Malay officials further agreed to the 
establishment of a high level border committee which was to meet twice annually. 
                                                 
39 Storey, “Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Southern Insurgency,” 7. 
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The border agreement was suspended in 1976 as a result of a major Malaysian 
operation into the Thai border zone, resulting in the cancellation of the “hot pursuit” 
clause, the removal of Malaysian police from Thai territory, and Bangkok’s request for a 
revised border agreement.  Bangkok’s request reflected long standing suspicions about 
Kuala Lumpur’s true intentions.  “The clearly understood quid pro quo for the border 
agreement was Malaysia non-intervention with respect to the Muslim separatists,” yet 
Bangkok was not convinced of Malaysia’s good faith.40   In fact, officials in Bangkok 
suspected that Kuala Lumpur might use Thai separatists for its own ends, appealing to 
their ethnic solidarity in garnering support against the CPM. 
Bangkok worried that a Thailand-Malaysia conflict would mobilize Thai Muslims 
in their own separatist efforts.  The two countries finally reached a revised agreement in 
March 1977.  Bangkok allowed Malaysian forces pursuit of CPM forces as well as basing 
rights in the border region, and Kuala Lumpur reciprocated with mutual pursuit 
privileges.  Conflict between the Malaysian government and CPM was not ended until 
1989, and would have been virtually impossible without Bangkok’s cooperation.  The 
example illustrates Thai-Malaysian capability to foster cooperative security frameworks 
despite mutual suspicions of intent.  Officials in Kuala Lumpur seem genuinely interested 
in improving the current bilateral relationship, but the “the Malay Muslim political 
establishment” and entrenched Thai mistrust have made progress difficult.41 
Another complicating aspect of the border is the 50,000 to 100,000 people 
“possessing identity cards from both Thailand and Malaysia.”42  Not only does this 
facilitate border access for those with dual citizenship, but it also allows residents of 
southern Thailand to vote in Malaysian elections.  Thus, those people deeply dissatisfied 
with the situation in Thailand can empower the Malaysian officials most likely to offer 
support, namely the PAS officials of Kelantan. The issue provides UMNO leadership in 
Kuala Lumpur considerable incentive to find a solution.   
                                                 
40 Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, 204. 
41 Vatikiotis, “Resolving Internal Conflicts,” 39. 
42 Storey, “Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Insurgency,” 8. 
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Malaysian fears of conflict spillover are warranted. Should regional or 
international terrorist organizations infiltrate the conflict, the porous Thai-Malaysian 
border would leave Malaysia vulnerable to subversive elements in its own Muslim 
population.  Muslims in Kelantan are commonly recognized as the most conservative in 
Malaysia.  Thai separatists’ intention to create a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia is a 
popular Islamic notion which would find a receptive audience in Kelantan.  Malaysian 
intervention could contain the Thai conflict while moderating Malaysian Islamist activity 
and ensuring domestic stability. 
3. Explaining Malaysian Non-Intervention 
In summary, relations between Thailand and Malaysia have been severely 
strained by the dynamics of the insurgency.  Despite the number of ways in which the 
Thai conflict could destabilize Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur remains unwilling to intervene.  
Neither ethnic ties nor border concerns, threats of spillover or the possibility of terrorist 
infiltration has compelled Malaysia to act.  Each affective consideration is tempered by a 
more politically significant instrumental interest.  The most comprehensive explanation 
of this circumstance is Kuala Lumpur’s fear of any legitimate accusation by Bangkok of 
interference. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains rooted in its 
“unique set of diplomatic norms which includes the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states.”43  The first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, affirmed that Malaysia “would not, under any circumstances, extend any 
sympathy or support for the separatist movement in Southern Thailand,” and since then 
all Malaysian governments have maintained the same strict policies dedicated to non-
interference.44  This fundamental tenet of ASEAN relations severely limits Kuala 
Lumpur’s options to effectively engage Bangkok.  If Malaysia intervened on a platform 
of alleviating the suffering of innocent Thai Muslims, Kuala Lumpur would be intensely 
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criticized for violating the association’s norms of non-interference.  If Malaysia 
intervened by somehow collaborating with Thai counterinsurgency operations, Kuala 
Lumpur would inflame domestic Muslim constituencies and alienate political supporters 
at home.  Thus, despite theoretically sound justifications for both affective and 
instrumental interventionist arguments, Malaysia maintains its neutrality in spite of 
deteriorating conditions in neighboring Thailand.   
Thailand’s seemingly paranoid but nonetheless persistent suspicions of Malaysian 
partisanship deserve consideration.  Malaysia could easily delay cooperative efforts in the 
border region, furthering Thailand’s domestic instability.  Doing so provides Malaysia 
the upper hand in bilateral relations and maintains Kuala Lumpur’s credibility with 
Malay Muslims.  As the border region has been a source of tension for decades, any 
inability to resolve the dispute would hardly be suspicious.  As long as the conflict does 
not spill over, inaction from Kuala Lumpur provides leverage against Bangkok in 
regional and international settings. 
C. THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
1. The Significance of History 
Thailand’s close ties with the United States were founded upon the shared anti-
communist policies of the Cold War.  The United States has provided military aid to 
Thailand since 1950.  Both countries signed the Manila Pact of the former Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, which remains in effect despite SEATO’s 
dissolution in 1977.  A mutual defense agreement, known as the Thanat-Rusk 
communiqué, was reached in 1962.  Bilateral relations have not always been smooth, and 
Bangkok distanced itself from Washington in 1975, largely due to the American defeat in 
Vietnam.  Thailand balanced its relations with the United States by agreeing to a new 
alliance with China.  By the 1980s, Thailand adopted a policy of “omnidirectionality,” 
stating that security concerns were no longer sufficiently addressed “in relation to one 
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patron-protector (the United States.)”45  While the new policy direction indicated an 
evolution in Thai regional and international considerations, it did not fundamentally 
change its relationship with the United States.  In 1982, the United States and Thailand 
initiated an annual defense exercise known as Cobra Gold which continues today as the 
cornerstone of bilateral defense cooperation between Bangkok and Washington. 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States declared war on 
terrorism.  Afghanistan received the bulk of America’s attention while the American 
intelligence apparatus sought out other Al-Qaeda areas of influence.  Southeast Asia was 
identified as having a significant presence of international terrorists.  On September 14, 
2001, Thailand dismissed outright the possibility that terrorists organized within its 
borders and declared itself neutral in the war on terror.46  The very next day, Thaksin 
publicly reversed the neutrality decision and declared support for U.S. efforts against 
terrorism, but the gesture clearly defined Thailand’s sentiment toward the effort.  Part of 
Prime Minister Thaksin’s neutrality response was political.  His successful campaign for 
Prime Minister was laden with “populist, nationalist, anti-foreign platforms.”  His 
landslide election demonstrated the popular support for his pro-Asian policies as he 
distanced himself from Washington.47  The events of 9/11 occurred while Thailand still 
begrudged the United States for its response to Thailand’s economic problems.  
Additionally, some officials believed that Thai support for the war on terror would 
reignite the quieted insurgency, preferring instead to maintain the status quo between the 
government and the separatist movement. 
When coerced into participating, Thai officials became protective of the delicate 
domestic balance which they believed was aggravated by the war on terror.  Prior to the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Thaksin requested that the Bush administration not publicly 
identify Thailand as a member of the U.S. led “coalition of the willing.”48  When 
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identified by CNN as a “silent partner” in the effort, Thaksin evaded direct questions on 
Thailand’s official position.  He attempted to balance Thailand’s loyalty to the United 
States against six million Thai Muslims.  Maintaining a strong military alliance with the 
United States was popular with the Thai military, but the Muslim population represented 
a significant voting bloc and powerful lobby supportive of Thaksin’s political party.49  In 
the end, Thaksin not only declared support for the war on terror, but dedicated 443 troops 
to assist in Iraq in 2003.  Thailand’s support for the Iraq War reinforced the strong 
military relationship valued by both Washington and Bangkok, and contributed to 
Thailand’s designation as a major non-NATO ally in October 2003. 
Thaksin rode a tide of pro-Asian promises into the Prime Minister’s office, but 
changed course following the events of September 2001 after receiving intense pressure 
from domestic and international sources to support the war on terror.  Concentrated 
diplomatic efforts by Washington lobbied Bangkok to “both cooperate more fully against 
terror and to participate in Washington’s campaign in Iraq.”50  The political momentum 
generated by the war on terrorism deteriorated the already tenuous relationship between 
Bangkok and Thai Muslims and contributed to the resurgence of separatist activity in the 
southern provinces.  Thailand’s decision to contribute troops to Iraq, as well as yielding 
to American requests to use U-Tapao Air Base to fight terrorism met harsh resistance 
from the Muslim community.  Thai Muslims largely interpreted Thaksin’s agreement to 
Washington’s requests as a political ploy to become a major U.S. ally in the region.51  
The issue unified Muslim extremists and moderates in southern Thailand who identified 
themselves as the true targets in the war on terror. 
2. Domestic Complications 
As Thaksin supported the war on terrorism internationally, domestic activities 
escalated.  Several law enforcement operations in 2002 and 2003 forced Thaksin into 
acknowledging a terrorist presence in Thailand.  Investigations discovered that the Bali 
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bombings had been planned in Bangkok.  Several law enforcement operations resulted in 
the arrests of Al-Qaeda or JI operatives in Thailand, and the arrests of Thai citizens 
working abroad for terrorist organizations.  The string of events significantly altered 
Bangkok’s approach to counterterrorism.  Dismissive policies quickly gave way to 
aggressive counterterrorism operations.  Thai security forces, no longer reluctant 
participants in the war on terror, instead began indiscriminate suppression of Muslim 
activities in the southern provinces, to include “large scale mass arrests and holding 
innocent individuals without charge.”52 
Two events in 2004 highlighted Bangkok’s mistaken approach to insurgent 
violence.  The widely publicized Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents embodied poor 
strategic responses by government agencies, and provided considerable influence for 
militants to rally support.  As if these events themselves did not provide enough 
motivation for insurgents, Prime Minister Thaksin and several army officials worsened 
the situation through insensitive and ignorant statements to the press.  Both Thaksin and 
his security forces grossly underestimated the effects from their missteps and reignited 
the smoldering insurgency.  Thaksin’s actions not only created animosity among 
domestic constituencies, but drew widespread criticism from regional and international 
sources to include the United States. 
Insurgent activity from January 2004 to October 2006 weakened popular support 
for the Thaksin administration that appeared incapable of effectively handling the 
situation.  Frustration with Thaksin’s leadership culminated in October 2006 when a 
military coup removed the Prime Minister from office.  The junta blamed government 
corruption and the erosion of democratic institutions for the growing cycle of violence in 
the Muslim provinces.  Coup leaders proclaimed their intention to pursue peaceful 
negotiations with the insurgents in an effort to address historical grievances.  The 
violence, however, has only escalated since October 2006, as the extremists take 
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advantage of the government instability.  The pre-coup average of 1.65 killings per day 
spiked to two killings per day in the 90-day period following Thaksin’s removal.53 
Despite the intense escalation of violent Muslim extremism and Bangkok’s 
complete inability to quell the violence, American counterterrorism operations within 
Thailand were limited to “joint CTIC-CIA activities.”54  The collaborative effort 
collected information on regional terrorist suspects, though focus shifted to the southern 
provinces with increased insurgent operations.55  More significantly, Thailand did not 
request any U.S. military assistance in the south, whereas the region’s other major non-
NATO ally, the Philippines, used its Islamic insurgency to garner a ten fold increase in 
American aid from 2001 to 2002.56  The United States also dedicated 200 forces to the 
Philippines for an annual joint exercise, and 190 Special Forces to train Philippines Army 
personnel in counterterrorism tactics.  The robust American response to the Philippines 
stands in stark contrast to the situation in Thailand.  The most reasonable explanation is 
constraints created by the domestic conditions in Thailand, which prevented Washington 
from taking a more proactive counter-insurgent contribution. 
3. Explaining U.S. Non-Intervention 
The U.S. position towards Thailand has been controversial since 2001.  Thaksin’s 
“war on drugs” seriously complicated diplomatic relations.  In 2003 the United States 
expressed concern regarding 2,274 people officially killed in counter-drug operations, 
culminating in an official letter of reproach to Thaksin requesting an explanation for the 
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killings.57  Fortunately for Bangkok, these criticisms occurred at the same time that 
Washington pressured Bangkok to join the Iraq War coalition.   
Washington’s foreign policy goals for Thailand became increasingly confused.  
“A letter circulated by Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich among U.S. lawmakers read 
in part: ‘Thailand is no longer the most democratic, open and free partner of the United 
States in Southeast Asia that it once was’."58 But the Bush Administration had to temper 
its human rights concerns with the priority of combating terrorism.  Thailand’s 
participation in Iraq and strategic value in Southeast Asia took precedence over other 
concerns.  Bangkok promised to conduct investigations into the killings, and Washington 
seemed content to focus on cooperation in the war on terror. 
The next major complication for diplomatic relations was the 2006 coup d'état 
when the popularly elected Thaksin was forcefully removed from office by military 
officers.  Prior to the coup, Thailand’s government was respected as a democratic leader 
in Southeast Asia.  Following the coup, Washington had to balance its emphasis on 
democratic institution building in the Middle East with an inconvenient interruption of 
democratic governance in a major ally.  Fortunately for Bangkok, Washington was forced 
to look the other way in favor of maintaining support for its broader counterterrorism 
initiatives.  
Washington’s consideration for international Islamic opinion deserves mention as 
an additional impediment to American intervention.  Unlike the situations in the 
Philippines and Indonesia where U.S. Special Forces provided assistance against 
identified terrorist organizations, Thailand has been strangely excluded from 
counterterrorist or counterinsurgent assistance from the United States.  Concern exists 
among American officials that “any assistance, however passive, would be immediately 
misunderstood by the local population.”59  The American precedents set in Afghanistan 
in 2001, the Philippines in 2002, and Iraq in 2003 demanded that Washington’s policy 
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towards resurgent Thai separatists in 2004 exhibit a prudent and measured response.  Any 
desire for overt intervention had to consider Thai public reaction as the domestic Muslim 
population was still angered by Thaksin’s support for the Iraq War.  The decision to 
avoid directly influencing Thailand's domestic response may have been a conscious effort 
to avert escalating moderate Muslims or inviting global terrorist involvement.60 
These series of events demonstrate two points.  First, Washington’s priorities are 
anchored by instrumental considerations tied to the Iraq War.  In supporting the coalition, 
Thailand secured steadfast American support.  Secondly, domestic political turmoil in 
Thailand prevented a genuine opportunity for American support following the 2004 
insurgent revival.  Thaksin’s inept handling of the situation inflamed public sentiment.  
Washington’s intervention then would have encouraged and even prolonged Thaksin’s 
autocratic behavior.  Following the 2006 coup, Washington had to distance itself from 
Bangkok and maintain support for the ousted administration which, despite the backlash, 
was popularly elected.  Thus, domestic problems in Bangkok effectively prohibited 
counter-insurgency assistance from the United States.  Unless Bangkok officially 
requests assistance from the United States regarding its struggles with Islamic insurgents, 
Washington will remain clear and encourage Bangkok to address its own domestic issues. 
D. THAILAND AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 
1. Thailand’s Vulnerabilities 
Thailand’s accessibility provides an ideal place for international terrorist 
networking to occur due to its ease of access for people and money.  Transnational 
criminals laid the groundwork for all kinds of subversive activity.61  Thailand’s notorious 
black market arms trade is supported by criminals and Thai military officials alike.  
Thailand’s drug trade has perfected techniques of money laundering and corruption.  It 
has lenient immigration and visa requirements and is surrounded by nations mired in their 
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own insurgencies and conflicts.62  But with the exception of a few links between 
international terrorists and Thai collaborators, investigators have found no significant 
relationships between Thai insurgents and international terrorist organizations.   
The lack of intervention by international terrorist organizations in southern 
Thailand stands out due to the parallel objectives between the groups.  Al Qaeda’s 
“strategic objective” is the “re-establishment an Islamic caliphate,” and a demonstrated 
means to achieve this end is the exploitation of narrowly defined domestic conflicts like 
Thailand’s. 63  Al Qaeda aims to cultivate domestic disturbances, and then sew them 
together “into the context of the wider global struggle.”64  As Thai insurgents fight to 
transform Thailand’s southern provinces into an Islamic state governed by sharia law, 
their goals appear to align perfectly with Al Qaeda’s agenda.  Thai insurgents would 
undoubtedly benefit from the financial resources and expertise available from Al Qaeda, 
so why does a lack of collaboration between the two groups persist? 
One proposed explanation is that Thai insurgents credit their successes to the 
currently employed strategy.  The government is completely unable to govern the 
southern provinces.65 Militants are free to choose the location and timing of their 
operations with little concern for getting caught.  Government officials, army personnel, 
and police officers are seen as targets of violence and therefore shunned by the 
communities they hope to protect.  The deteriorated situation in Thailand’s southern 
provinces now allows the insurgents to focus on the development of an Islamic state 
governed by sharia law, contributing to the regional pursuit of a pan-Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia. 
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2. Insurgent Transformation 
Today’s militants have accomplished what past Thai separatists were unable to by 
transforming the nature of the insurgency.  Planning and recruitment largely began with 
youth who were contacted through Islamic schools.   Historical attempts by government 
officials to secularize Islamic schooling created the fertile environment which insurgents 
targeted.  During the 1960s, the Islamic schools were forced to supplement their religious 
curricula with secular subjects.  Those schools unwilling to cooperate were closed.  
Islamic schools decreased from 535 in 1961 to 189 in the early 1990s.  Since then, 
privately funded religious schools in Thailand have seen a remarkable resurgence.  In 
2004, Thailand had 500 registered Islamic schools, more than 2000 teachers, and over 
25,000 students.  In the last fifteen years, more than 2,500 Thai Muslims were educated 
in Saudi Arabia, and 2,500 more Thai students attended Islamic schools elsewhere in the 
Middle East and South Asia.66  The domestic and foreign Islamic educational 
opportunities are largely financed through Islamic charities and other Middle Eastern 
organizations.  The religious curricula are dictated by the financiers and are based on 
more fundamental types of Islam which are reshaping the identity of Thai Muslims.  
Students studying abroad often return to Thailand in search of jobs in education, 
providing a conduit to ambitious and vulnerable young Muslims open more 
fundamentalist types of Islam.  
Today’s Islamic schools provide insurgents ideal centers of organization and 
recruitment.  Islamic clerics and teachers not only provide ideological mentoring but act 
as intermediate evaluators of student “piety, impressionability, and agility.”67  Students 
are recruited through a trusted teacher or cleric, normally through invitations to prayers 
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meetings.  Those choosing to join are sworn to secrecy, trained in weapons, sabotage, 
recruitment, or propaganda and expected to build an operational insurgent cell.68   
In creating a youth movement to indoctrinate members and compel them to the 
radical ideology, insurgents have transformed the ineffective organization of past 
separatist movements.  No longer a collection of disorganized and independent protesters, 
the insurgency is now comprised of a highly effective and exceedingly violent network of 
cells.  The insurgents tend to organize into small groups known as RKK (Runda 
Kumpulan Kecil, small patrol groups) which number five or six people.  The exceedingly 
flat network is suspected of reaching 500 of the 2,000 villages of the Southern Thai 
provinces, while the larger organization of the National Revolutionary Front - Coordinate 
stretches into 800 of those same villages.69  Most RKK cells do not interact and rarely 
know the identities of their counterparts.  Tactical decisions have been pushed 
increasingly to lower levels.  The decentralized, small unit organization continues to 
baffle counterinsurgent efforts.  Through the end of 2005, the Thai security presence 
swelled to between 20,000 and 30,000 army and police personnel within the Muslim 
provinces, creating a ratio of security personnel to insurgents of 30:1.  Despite the 
overwhelming numbers, Thai intelligence and security officials failed to identify the 
participants or leadership engaged in terrorist activities. 
The imposition of increasingly radicalized Islam on young Thai Muslims allows 
insurgents to capitalize on a larger trend emerging in Southeast Asia.  The voices of 
tolerant and pluralist Muslims who historically dominated the region and their secular 
governments have been drowned by a dangerous and intolerant form of Islam emanating 
from the Middle East.  Evidence of intolerance is seen in the shifting targets among Thai 
insurgents.  Traditional targets were primarily Thai Buddhists and government officials 
whereas today’s insurgents also execute uncooperative Muslims.  Insurgents kill anyone 
who receives a paycheck from the government, teachers who support mixed curriculums, 
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Muslim clerics willing to perform burial rites for apostates, and other collaborators.70  
Incidents of beheadings have increased dramatically.  Sixty teachers have been killed as 
state schools are often seen as tools for state assimilation.  Some teachers were 
executed in front of their classrooms.71  Many state schools in the south have been 
closed, and those which remain open are targets for arson or bombing, forcing  
Muslim youths to attend private Islamic schools. 
The insurgency has succeeded in creating some Islamic institutions in the south to 
replace defunct government offices.  “Ad hoc sharia courts” provide the only means of 
official conflict resolution.  Insurgents have prevented women from giving birth in state 
hospitals.  Beyond concern for the safety of mothers and children, wider concerns include 
unregistered births which prevent children from attending state schools and block 
accessibility to the state healthcare system.  The examples portray an insurgency 
unconcerned about garnering widespread Muslim support in southern Thailand, and 
instead pursuing a religiously founded Islamist agenda.72 
3. Explaining International Terrorism’s Non-intervention 
Insurgent leadership is no longer driven by the political motivation of 
independence and autonomy.  Instead, they have applied an Islamic fundamentalist 
approach to a Communist revolutionary model employed in Thailand years ago.73  
Insurgents utilized the same seven step process as Thai Communist revolutionaries to 
expand the organization, but then focused on religious motivation as opposed to a 
Communist economic and political agenda.  The change demonstrates a tactical shift 
away any intention to “liberate Patani from Thailand” in favor of  “liberating Muslims 
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from the infidels.”74  Thus, insurgents are motivated by a puritanical from of Islam which 
has inspired pursuit of an Islamic state in southern Thailand regardless of Bangkok’s 
position.  In the three years since the insurgency reignited, they have realized widespread 
success.  Having restructured and decentralized the organization, created effective 
institutions for recruitment, and employed an exceedingly violent but still low intensity  
 
strategy, today’s insurgents have accomplished what previous separatists could not.  Most 
significantly, they have achieved success without allowing international terrorist 
organizations to intervene. 
In essence, by preventing the incorporation of international terrorist networks, the 
insurgency has maintained its status as a domestic problem and avoided massive 
international intervention.  As seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, the presence 
of Al Qaeda personnel quickly results in international counterterrorism operations and 
participation by American or coalition forces.  At this point, both the insurgency and 
international terrorists must be perfectly content with the situation in southern Thailand.  
Any assistance from international terrorists could just as quickly be detrimental to the 
insurgency’s operation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The continuation of the Thai insurgency as a completely domestic struggle defies 
scholarship on conflict intervention.  The escalating nature of ethnic violence, cross 
boundary kinship, and tragic loss of life all suggest that international actors should 
attempt to secure their own interests in southern Thailand.  Yet, those parties with the 
most to gain or lose remain outside observers.  This chapter has examined why the 
benefits of intervening do not outweigh the costs.   
For Malaysia, longstanding ethnic ties with Muslims in southern Thailand cannot 
overcome ASEAN’s expectations of non-interference.  Neither kinship nor fears of 
conflict spillover have trumped this institutional norm.  The ability of PAS officials in 
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Kelantan to continually criticize UMNO inaction persists as a chronic vulnerability of the 
national leadership.  Nonetheless, regional pressure to conform to the ASEAN mold has 
been institutionalized, exposing Malaysia to a dangerously unstable environment in 
southern Thailand.  At this point, Malaysian intervention to assist Muslim victims may be 
more likely than support for insurgents.  Hesitation on securing the border and allowing 
refugees access may demonstrate Malaysia’s unspoken intentions. 
The United States needs all possible international support for its controversial war 
on terror.  Washington’s priorities lie with efforts in Iraq, and those nations remaining 
supportive of coalition efforts will be rewarded for their solidarity.  The balancing of 
democratic freedoms with enhanced security has not been resolved in the United States, 
so holding a close ally accountable for the same condition seems unlikely.  Thailand’s 
struggle between democracy and security is a byproduct of terrorism that Washington has 
political capital to accept.  Simply stated, Thailand’s strategic value to U.S. interests 
outweighs concerns for the simmering insurgency.  Any intervention by American forces 
will occur only after receiving an official request from Bangkok. 
Thai insurgents share sharply parallel interests with international terrorist 
organizations.  Nonetheless, insurgents maintain the domesticity of the conflict by 
keeping international supporters away.  In doing so, insurgents avoid attracting an 
overwhelming international coalition dedicated to defeating their Islamist movement.  Up 
to this point, Thai insurgents have been extremely successful.  Southern Thailand remains 
ungovernable and security forces are little more than vulnerable targets.  Residents in 
southern Thailand have no faith in their government to provide protection or defeat the 
insurgency.  As a result, insurgents are more than willing to continue with their strategy, 
which has achieved their domestic objective while remaining at a level which does not 
attract broader international attention. 
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III. THE PHILIPPINES 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES’ MUSLIM INSURGENCY 
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has battled against 
Islamic separatism for more than 35 years.  The war, which began in 1972, has claimed 
more than 130,000 lives and generated more than 500,000 refugees.75  The first modern 
organization to demand independence for the Moro people was the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF).76  With the “tacit sympathy of Malaysia” and the “favor of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),” the MNLF initiated its deadly armed 
conflict against the government in 1973.77  After only three years, the MNLF and GRP 
signed the Tripoli Agreement which granted autonomy to areas in which a Muslim 
majority resided.  The government took an astonishing fourteen years to approve 
legislation enacting the agreement, and a final peace settlement was not signed until 
1996. 
The MNLF, which had initially sought independence yet settled for autonomy, 
was factionalized in its support for the agreement.  The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) separated from the MNLF in 1977 and competed politically with the MNLF for 
Muslim favor.  Having rejected the Tripoli Agreement, the MILF continued to pursue 
independence militarily.  A smaller but highly radical organization, known as the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG), rejected the agreement as well.  ASG split from the MNLF in 1991 
to pursue its own violent efforts to create a Muslim state in the southern Philippines.  The 
Philippine government subsequently failed to implement its promises of development and 
economic growth for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  Much of  
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the popular support for the MNLF diminished.  Hopes for a renewed push towards 
independence became associated with the MILF and widespread loyalties shifted away 
from the MNLF.78 
MILF led insurgent activity continued through the latter part of the 1990s.  
International awareness grew of MILF collaboration with the terrorist organizations 
ASG, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and Al Qaeda just as the MILF and the GRP agreed to a 
cease fire agreement in 2001.79  While separatist activity in the Philippines was rarely 
isolated domestically, the presence of transnational terrorist organizations combined with 
a post–September 11 counterterrorism environment to redefine the Moro insurgency.  As 
a result, external dimensions of the conflict grew.  In leading the retaliation against the 
9/11 attackers, the United States quickly developed a plan to assist Philippine forces 
combat embedded Al Qaeda terrorists as well as Moro insurgents.80  Washington 
promised personnel and funding for Philippine efforts under the auspices of the Global 
War on Terrorism.  Regional concern was represented by neighboring Malaysia, who for 
years was plagued domestically by spillover effects of Moro activity.81  As a Muslim 
majority nation and an international leader in Muslim affairs, Malaysia was critical to the 
resumption of talks, guaranteeing Muslim representation as the facilitator of MILF and 
GRP negotiations.82  In sum, intervention by international terrorists, U.S. counterterrorist 
operatives, and Malaysian settlement mediators continue to play an integral role in the 
Philippine conflict. 
This chapter will analyze the intervention of Malaysia, the United States, and 
international terrorist organizations into the Moro conflict.  Each has significant histories 
with the Philippines which influence its interventionist policy.  Furthermore, each has an 
impact on prospects for peace.  An understanding of the external dimensions contributes 
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to a broader appreciation of the delicate balance which must simultaneously address the 
root causes of Islamic unrest, eliminate extremism, and establish domestic stability.  
Section one discusses Malaysia’s role in the peace negotiations between the Philippine 
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  Kuala Lumpur, an outspoken 
representative for Islamic issues and Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference from 2003 through 2006, must certainly be driven by religious unanimity 
with the Moro nation.  However, its official position is complicated by lingering bilateral 
disputes with the Philippine government surrounding the state of Sabah on the island of 
Borneo.  How Malaysia balances Islamic solidarity with ASEAN norms is critical in 
analyzing Kuala Lumpur’s effectiveness as the primary peace facilitator. 
Section two addresses the vastly improved U.S.-Philippines relations which 
followed the attacks of September 11.  Philippine President Gloria Arroyo was reported 
to be “the first Asian leader to have called President Bush following the attacks.”83  In 
her show of solidarity with Washington and willingness to support the War on Terror, 
President Arroyo secured “$92 million in military equipment” as well as American forces 
to assist in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group.84  American officials from the United 
States Institute for Peace participate actively in the peace process.  Thus, Washington’s 
influence is significant diplomatically and militarily in the conflict.  Whether its 
humanitarian efforts or security initiatives are weighted evenly will influence American 
effectiveness in establishing stability. 
Section three examines the complicating influence of international terrorist 
organizations for the peace process.  Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, 
and the Abu Sayyaf Group are identified on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations and are 
known to have trained in MILF camps.  The GRP has opposed labeling the MILF as 
terrorists, fearing the designation would impede negotiations.  While the MILF 
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relationship with JI and ASG remains suspect, the mere presence of JI and ASG fuels 
doubt that a peaceful settlement with the MILF will end separatism in the Philippines. 
B. THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA 
1. Bilateral Tensions 
The relationship between Manila and Kuala Lumpur has endured several disputes 
that underpin the current situation.  The first controversy focuses on the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea.  A 1995 dispute regarding Mischief Reef, which had previously 
been limited to the Philippines and China, expanded to include Malaysia in June of 1999.  
Manila accused Kuala Lumpur of building structures on Philippine claims and threatened 
to build its own structures on disputed areas if the situation remained contentious.  
Malaysia denied that its buildings were on Philippine territory and proposed to resolve 
the issue through ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 
Another problematic situation between the two countries concerned the strained 
relationship between national leaders.  In 1998, Philippine President Joseph Estrada 
harshly criticized Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s treatment of his deputy, Anwar 
Ibrahim.  Estrada’s comments on the Malaysian domestic political crisis were labeled by 
Mahathir as “unacceptable conduct and an infringement on Malaysian sovereignty.”85  
Estrada was a personal friend of Ibrahim and used his professional status as a platform to 
protest a perceived injustice.  Estrada subsequently held a personal meeting with 
Ibrahim’s wife and daughter, but backed away from further confrontation following 
guidance from his own political advisors.86 
The oldest and most significant dispute surrounds the East Malaysian state of 
Sabah.  The Philippine government believes that an 1878 treaty leased the territory to the 
British North Borneo Company, while the Malaysian government claims that the territory 
was purchased.  In its 1963 expansion of the Federation of Malaysia, the British included 
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the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak.  The Philippines disputed Britain’s legal claim 
to the territory, but received little international attention despite the severance of bilateral 
ties in 1963.  The situation remains unresolved today, and Sabah’s inclusion to the 
Federation of Malaysia is as much due to Philippine inaction towards Sabah as it is to any 
legal resolution.87 
2. Malaysian Precedents of Ethnic Intervention 
In discussing the current relationship between the Philippines and Malaysia, the 
highlighted disputes provide a foundation for understanding the complexities of bilateral 
grievances.  However, in analyzing the Philippines struggle against southern insurgents, 
consideration must be given to Malaysia’s history of support of separatist activity.  Sabah 
lies only ten miles from the Sulu archipelago.  The geographic orientation of the area 
resulted in a population well suited to maritime trade and travel, and regular interaction 
occurred between ethnic groups in Sulu and Sabah.  When separatist activity in the 
Philippines increased in the early 1960s, Sabah’s political leader was Tun Mustapha, an 
ethnic Tausig, which is the same ethnic group from which the chairman of the MNLF 
came.88  Allegations persisted of Sabah’s “toleration, even assisting the provision of 
military supplies to the Muslim rebels and providing sanctuary for Moro fighters.”89  
Further accusations followed that Tun Mustapha allowed Moro separatists to establish 
training camps, logistical supply points, and communication hubs in Sabah from which 
arms were smuggled to guerillas in Mindanao and to which casualties were returned for 
medical attention.  The Malaysian government has never admitted assisting Philippine 
insurgents in their struggle for independence; however, experts assert that “Malaysian 
assistance gave the essential incentive to Moro separatists and enabled the Moros to 
elevate the level of conflict from a fight for equality and justice to a war of liberation, 
demanding self-determination.”90 
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Malaysian assistance for Moro fighters diminished in the late 1970s due to a 
transfer of political power in Sabah.  New leadership reflected popular angst by non-
Muslim Sabahans that the influx of Philippine immigrants tipped the balance of political 
influence.  Policies of accommodation for Moro militants ceased in Sabah, but were 
replaced with effort to increase support for the Moro cause internationally.  Malaysia’s 
first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, promoted the plight of the Moro people to 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference.  As the OIC’s secretary-general from 1971 
until 1973, he presented the situation to influential Muslim countries and secured OIC 
support for the southern Philippine Muslims.  Ironically, motivation for gaining OIC 
visibility was not believed to have been driven by any religious or ethnic sense of duty, 
but instead as a coercive attempt at convincing the Philippine government to relinquish 
its claim for Sabah.91 
3. Affective versus Instrumental Motivations 
The main issue in Sabah today concerns an influx of Philippine Muslims from 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.92  The area has been the home of sea gypsies 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with little to no accountability for the 
movement of people between Sulu and Sabah.  Today’s Philippine immigrant population 
in Sabah has surpassed 600,000 people and wields considerable influence upon Sabah’s 
domestic political agenda.  Competition between Malaysian citizens and Philippine 
immigrants has grown more intense.93  Legal Philippine immigrants who have resettled 
in Sabah harbor sympathy and support for those fleeing Philippines today in search of a 
better life.  However, concerns surrounding the vast numbers of Philippine refugees are 
hotly debated in terms of security and public health.94 
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The presence of terrorists in Southeast Asia also generates demand among 
counterterrorism officials for improved accountability of the movement of people 
between the Philippines and Malaysia.95  The area between Sulu and Sabah remains a 
prime operating area for the Abu Sayyaf Group, drawing intense scrutiny from Malaysian 
and Philippine counterterrorism officials.  Additionally, the elevated levels of Filipino 
immigration to Sabah have driven Malaysian attempts to stop immigration completely.  
The sheer numbers of immigrants have strained the infrastructure in Sabah.  Fears 
surround the spread of infectious disease and the costs of caring for those awaiting 
deportation. 96  Officials in Sabah responded to citizens’ demands to deport illegal 
immigrants and repeatedly criticized the Philippine government for the perceived lack of 
cooperation repatriating its citizens.97 
4. Malaysian Mediation  
Due to its effects across the archipelagic region and throughout Southeast Asia, 
the Moro insurgency could no longer be considered a Philippine domestic issue.  In 2000, 
the Sipadan hostage crisis was closely followed by then Philippine President Joseph 
Estrada’s “all out war” declaration against the MILF.98  Malaysian officials became 
increasingly concerned about the Philippines deteriorating security situation, which 
threatened Malaysia’s tourist industry as well as regional counterterrorism initiatives.  Dr. 
Kamarulzaman Askandar, Coordinator of Research and Education for Peace, School, and 
Social Sciences as well as the Regional Coordinator of Southeast Asian Conflict Studies 
Network was quoted as saying, “the events in South Philippines have become part of our 
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national interest.”99  In a separate academic observation, he noted that Malaysia would 
play an even larger role “because it is in the interest of Malaysia that the conflict is 
resolved.  If the negotiations break down, Malaysia will do something to get it started 
again.  It will want to do more.  It is not just a Philippine problem but a Malaysian 
problem because of its effects.”100 
President Arroyo recognized Malaysian ambitions upon assuming the presidency 
in 2001 and created a central role for Kuala Lumpur in the Philippine peace process.  
Malaysian involvement was integral to Arroyo’s peace plan because MILF officials 
conditioned their willingness to negotiate on the inclusion of the OIC or an OIC member.  
Thus, both sides of the Philippine negotiating table valued Malaysian participation, 
establishing Malaysia’s role as an acceptable mediator.101 
Malaysian participation in the Philippine peace process officially began in March 
2001.  A variety of titles exist for Malaysia’s position, but descriptions of Malaysian 
involvement are consistent.  First, Malaysia acts as the host for all sessions, “providing an 
atmosphere that is conducive to negotiations.”102  Malaysian officials are present for all 
discussions and limit support to administrative duties during straightforward 
deliberations.  When contentious issues arise, Malaysian mediators assume a more central 
role, “providing advice” on difficult issues or “proposing a way around” the impasse.103  
“It is a referee’s role,” according to Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Presidential Advisor on 
the Peace Process.  “The presence of Malaysia’s representative is important as a witness 
to important commitments or understandings, some of which many not have been put in 
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writing.”104  Malaysia’s role is to ease tensions between two resolute parties, maintain 
forward momentum, and pursue conflict resolution issue by issue. 
Any concern for Malaysia’s balancing of its instrumental concerns for sovereignty 
and security against with its affective loyalties for Philippine Muslims was addressed 
early on by Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysian Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003.  In a 
speech given on March 26, 2001, Dr. Mahathir told the MILF delegation that peace had 
to be achieved through a political settlement, suggesting to the MILF leadership that the 
war for succession be ended.105  Later that same year, at the opening ceremony of the 
Second Formal Peace talks on July, 24, 2001, Malaysian representative Datuk Zakaria 
commented, “it is in the best interest of the Bangsamoro, the Philippine government and 
the region that any compromise would have to be based on the principle of no 
independence and respect for the integrity and sovereignty of the Philippine nation.”106 
5. Explaining Malaysian Intervention 
Malaysian facilitation of peace talks seems to be influenced by contradictory 
interests.  As a Muslim-majority country and the Chairman of the OIC from 2003 until 
2006, Malaysia harbors Islamic loyalties which seem to dictate a protectionist position 
for their religious brethren.  Furthermore, the country’s dominant political party, United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO), has been the target of intense criticism by rival 
political parties for its perceived lack of support for Thai Muslims in their separatist 
action.  Thus, the situation in Sabah provides another opportunity for Malaysian national 
leadership to support its Islamic brethren in the Philippines and improve Islamic 
solidarity with Southeast Asia.   
Contrary to affective loyalties, the Malaysian officials participating in the 
Philippine peace process must maintain the trust of Manila as an impartial arbiter.  
Furthermore, consideration must be given that any suggestion to compromise Philippine 
sovereignty in favor of an independent Moro territory would seriously inflame the 
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lingering territorial disputes surrounding Mischief Reef and Sabah.  Nonetheless, support 
for Philippine sovereignty directly counters the MILF separatist agenda.   
The foundation of ASEAN norms provides a significant portion of the 
explanation of Malaysia’s position.  Malaysia clearly understands the degree to which it 
is limited in supporting Moro independence, and instead utilizes its leadership to deal 
with the root causes of the separatist movement.  In doing so, Kuala Lumpur effectively 
addresses its own domestic concerns.  First, by achieving a durable peace between the 
GRP and the MILF, Malaysian officials significantly alleviate immigration problems 
which have plagued its bilateral relations with the Philippines.  Secondly, Malaysia can 
leverage its facilitation of peaceful settlement of Moro separatism with its claims to 
Sabah and the maintenance of its own sovereignty.  Thirdly, ending Moro hostilities in 
the southern Philippines will considerably reduce the ability of international terrorists to 
find safe haven there, improving the security situation in Malaysia and Southeast Asia.  
Thus, Malaysia’s desire for an end to the GRP-Moro conflict is driven as much by 
domestic concerns for security and stability as it is by concerns for its Muslim brethren.  
Improving the conditions in the southern Philippines will reduce the incentive for 
insurgent activity and increase the willingness of Moro people to integrate into peaceful 
and productive sectors of their communities. 
C. THE PHILIPPINES AND THE-UNITED STATES 
1. An Eroding Partnership 
The 1991 decision by the Philippines not to renew American leases for Subic 
Naval Station and Clarke Air Force Base brought to an end nearly 100 years of American 
military presence in the Philippines.  While the bond between Washington and Manila 
was forged under a colonial relationship, it blossomed during the Cold War into a 
strategic alliance valued by both nations.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
United States reevaluated security threats in the Pacific and considered a major regional 
realignment of forces “to stimulate greater collaboration among Asian allies and 
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friends.”107  Consideration was given to reducing the American footprint in the 
Philippines for a more disperse distribution of forces throughout the region.  Manila 
conducted its own strategic reassessment, and without a common security threat 
Washington’s value was reduced to the income received which paid for American basing 
rights.  The partnership between Washington and Manila reached an impasse, resulting in 
Abuza, Balik-Terrorism, the Philippine Senate’s refusal to renew the base leases.  The 
United States was given a three year timeline for withdrawal of all military forces, which 
Washington spitefully declined for an accelerated one year plan.108 
Ties were not completely severed during the 1990s.  The Mutual Defense Treaty 
remained intact, though American military leadership qualified their ability to respond 
without the resource infrastructure previously maintained on Philippine soil.  The annual 
Balikatan exercise continued as did American ship visits.  A warming of sorts occurred in 
the late 1990s due to the encroachment of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.  Manila’s 
appreciation of Washington’s favor increased as the Chinese claimed a significant area of 
the South China Sea as well as Mischief Reef.  Manila decided to revisit its ties with the 
Washington in order to balance against Chinese influence.109  The situation allowed the 
United States to reaffirm its security commitment in the region while subtly reintroducing 
an American military influence in the Philippines. 
2. Common Ground 
While the growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia generated small 
opportunities to reestablish relations between Manila and Washington, the September 11 
attacks exponentially improved diplomatic, economic, and military commitments 
between the two countries.  The United States had quickly infiltrated Al Qaeda’s safe 
haven in Afghanistan and commenced a global search to expose other areas where the 
terrorist organization had anchored its network.  The Philippines became an area of 
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interest due to an eerily similar terrorist plot exposed years earlier.  In 1994, Ramzi 
Yousef was an Al Qaeda operative who had established a terrorist cell in Manila.  The 
cell was identified in 1995 by Philippine police, who discovered a scheme to plant bombs 
on twelve U.S. international flights as well as crash an airplane into CIA headquarters in 
Langley, Virginia.110  The information was shared with American intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, yet very little investigation followed Yousef’s arrest in Pakistan in 
January 1995.  He was subsequently extradited to the United States where his trail and 
life-sentencing for the 1993 World Trade Center attacks was celebrated as a victory for “a 
law enforcement system well equipped to cope with terrorism.”111  However, the events 
of September 11, 2001, put the Manila air plot into context and reignited the need to 
accurately identify Al Qaeda’s infiltration of the Philippine Muslim community. 
Soon after the attacks, President Arroyo declared unconditional support for U.S. 
efforts and stated that “her administration would go ‘all out’ to assist the United 
States.”112  Arroyo reopened Philippine seaports and airports to American military units, 
agreed to intelligence collaboration, and committed logistical support.  She committed to 
cleaning up Philippine extremists by escalating the war on terrorism within her own 
country.113  Arroyo insisted that the Philippine security situation was directly linked to its 
strategic relationship with the United States,114 a position some analysts viewed as 
political opportunism rooted in domestic political ambition.  The situation provided 
Arroyo an ideal conduit for permanently repairing relations with the United States, 
defeating domestic Islamic extremism, evicting Al Qaeda, and consolidating her hold on 
power.115  Regardless of Arroyo’s motivation, the Bush administration was fully 
prepared to reward Manila’s loyalty and assist Philippine forces in eradicating Al Qaeda 
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and radical extremism from the Philippines.  Washington dedicated $284.86 million in 
military aid between 2002 and 2004.  Exercise Balikatan, a bilateral military training 
evolution which had fallen out of favor after 1996 was quickly restored, and 1,300 
American troops, to include 160 Special Operations soldiers conducted joint operations 
during the first six months of 2002.116   
American military leadership intended Balikatan 2002-1 as an opportunity to 
improve “U.S.-Philippine combined planning, combat readiness, and interoperability.”117  
The effort demonstrated U.S. commitment for Philippine counterterrorism operations, but 
also contained opportunities to achieve broader counterinsurgency goals and regional 
security objectives.  First, American and Philippine troops were largely successful in 
removing the Abu Sayyaf Group from the targeted area of Basilan.  The military victory 
allowed increased levels of “humanitarian assistance and civic action projects” for 
communities of Basilan, which improved living conditions for the Muslim population and 
“restored a sense of peace and security in the province.”118  Secondly, the presence of 
American military troops in Southeast Asia provided a renewing of Washington’s 
regional security commitment and was a critical step in demonstrating its resolve of 
confronting terrorism globally.  The Philippine-American alignment was the first logical 
step in accomplishing regional security due to the “traditional role this relationship has 
played in the management of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.”119 
3. Multifaceted Intervention 
American intervention in the Philippines was intentionally robust while at the 
same time strategically calculating in its objectives.  Critics suggested that American 
actions were a Christian crusade to destroy the troublesome Muslim population of the 
southern Philippines, citing religious and political parallels between Washington and 
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Manila as evidence.120  Admittedly, the United States has a long and dynamic 
relationship with the Philippines.  As a previous American colony, the Philippines 
political structure is similar in many ways to the United States.  Furthermore, the 
population of the Philippines is 94% Christian and only 5% Muslim.  The United States 
is both the Philippines largest trading partner and largest investor, resulting in more than 
“$16 billion in two way trade and greater than $6 billion in assets.”121  However, the 
political, military, and economic interdependence of the two nations which allegedly 
bolsters the anti-Muslim charge fails to explain U.S. interventionist policies in the 
Philippines.  Washington and Manila jointly agreed to militarily eliminate the Abu 
Sayyaf Group while pursuing a political reconciliation with the MILF.122  The groups 
share a number of common characteristics.  Both existed in the Philippines long before 
the Global War on Terror, both have utilized terror as a means to achieve political 
objectives, and both have networked with the regional terrorist organization Jemaah 
Islamiyah as well as Al Qaeda.  Understanding why the Bush administration has allowed 
two different tactics to engage each group assists in comprehending American 
motivations. 
As previously mentioned, the MILF grew out of a dispute with the MNLF in 
1977.  Both groups claimed to fight for the Moro people of the Philippines, but pursued 
different political objectives in their efforts.  The 1996 peace agreement signed between 
the MNLF and the Philippine government was not recognized by the MILF, who 
continued to demand independence.123  The Al Qaeda network, which exploits long 
running insurgencies for the enabling environment they create, recognized the separatist 
struggle in the Philippines as an ideal place to operate and established a presence in the 
southern Philippines for recruiting, training, funding, and organizing.  Philippine 
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Muslims fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and then returned to apply terrorist 
knowledge in Southeast Asia.  Despite the history of interrelationships and common 
interests, JI and Al Qaeda maintain global objectives that do not coincide with the central 
motivation of the MILF.  Following 9/11, the MILF intentionally distanced themselves 
from the Taliban and Abu Sayyaf and agreed to resume peace negotiations with the 
GRP.124  Furthermore, the MILF agreed to assist Philippine efforts against terrorists by 
providing intelligence against JI, Al Qaeda, and Abu Sayyaf as well as denying safe 
haven for these same operatives.  U.S. policy makers understand that a peaceful solution 
to the MILF conflict would eliminate Mindanao’s potential as another Afghanistan-like 
operating area for the terror industry.125  The strategy also slows the spread of Islamic 
militancy in Southeast Asia by demonstrating a willingness to resolve long-standing 
Muslim grievances.126 
The Abu Sayyaf Group also split from the MNLF and has ties to Bin Laden 
stretching back to the Afghan-Soviet conflict.  Unlike the MILF, Abu Sayyaf continued 
collaboration with regional and international terrorist organizations following 9/11.  In 
fact, at the time of the September 11 attacks, Abu Sayyaf was holding two American 
missionaries for ransom, which resulted in the group’s inclusion on the “first list of 27 
individuals and organizations whose assets were frozen by the United States because of 
links to the Al Qaeda network.”127  Abu Sayyaf, not the MILF, provided the core 
explanation for restoring U.S. military cooperation with the Philippines.  Incidentally, 
Abu Sayyaf’s collaboration and networking with regional terrorist organizations have 
allowed it to remain a threat to the stability of the southern Philippines and the region. 
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The divided approach to the MILF versus ASG clearly demonstrates that the Bush 
administration does not blindly target Muslims or Islamic insurgencies.  Its goal is to 
eliminate forces “all too willing to use indiscriminate violence in pursuit of their radical 
agenda, and all too willing to form tactical alliances with transnational terrorist 
organizations.”128  American leadership has shown a willingness to distinguish between 
terrorists and separatists driven by legitimate grievances.  In their support of peace 
negotiations between the MILF and GRP, the United States demonstrates an 
understanding that any accommodation and agreement which might end years of violent 
separatism depends on addressing the domestic issues which lie at the heart of the 
conflict. 
4. American Participation in Peace Process and Development 
American intervention into the Philippines was not limited to bilateral military 
cooperation.  Washington’s commitment to peaceful reconciliation included funding for 
the development of impoverished Muslim areas as well as representation for the peace 
negotiations.  The two American organizations most closely associated with this 
commitment are the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).   
In 2003, the U.S. State Department introduced USIP to the Mindanao peace 
process after receiving a request from President Arroyo for assistance in facilitating 
negotiations.  The USIP is an “independent, nonpartisan, national institution established 
and funded by Congress.”129  The institute operates within conflict eras to “prevent and 
resolve violent international conflict, promote post-conflict stability and development, as 
well as increase conflict management capacity.”130  The Philippine Facilitation Project, 
part of USIP’s Center for Mediation and Conflict, labored for four years in order to 
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“create an equitable and durable peace agreement to foster reconciliation and stability in 
the Philippines and surrounding areas of Southeast Asia.”131 
Efforts by the U.S. delegation were in direct support of the government of 
Malaysia, which maintains the primary role as negotiation facilitator.  The Philippine 
Facilitation Project representatives conducted research into the underlying causes of the 
dispute, built widespread public support for the peace process, and provided consultation 
in conflict management and resolution techniques.  In fact, this was among the first 
instances when USIP representatives were designated as “on-the-ground” facilitators, 
which underpins the centrality both the MILF and GRP place on American participation 
with regard to reconciliation.  Washington’s support for the peace process grants 
international legitimacy to the effort, and is accompanied by promises of funding for the 
development of impoverished Muslim areas.  The U.S. economic influence cannot be 
separated from the diplomatic support.  
USAID works with both the Philippine government and targeted areas of 
Mindanao to “strengthen the foundation for peace” and provide development areas for the 
conflict affected areas of the island.132    Their efforts in the Philippines reflect the 
evolution of development strategies from pre and post 9/11 eras.  Traditional focus areas 
included economic growth, governance, environmental degradation, family planning, and 
public health.  Following September 11, the strategy of assistance to conflicted areas was 
redesigned in order to provide prospects of development complimentary to the peace 
initiatives.  For instance, development strategies attempt not only to reduce poverty, but 
in doing so allow traditionally marginalized groups a more participatory role in economic 
and political life.  Emphasis is put on “upward mobility and pluralism to help address the 
root causes of terrorism and violence, including perceived injustice, political alienation, 
and severe deprivation.”133  USAID efforts have resulted in reintegrating more than 
24,000 former MNLF combatants into the peacetime economy and prevented their return 
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to combat arms.  These former separatists live in some of the most deprived areas of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The training and education 
provided by USAID for MNLF combatants provide a positive example of the types of 
U.S. development efforts which would be available following a successful agreement 
between the GRP and the MILF. 
5. Explaining American Intervention 
American intervention in the Philippines contains elements of both military 
counterterrorist operations and humanitarian relief.  The strategy confronts important 
challenges.  First, not all insurgents in the conflict are prepared to lay down arms and 
negotiate.  In fact, violent extremism in the Philippines remains as harsh reality 
exemplified in the July 2007 killing of fourteen Philippine Marines, ten of whom were 
beheaded.134  The event, which created grave concerns for the peace process, 
demonstrates the influence that terrorist organizations wield on political reconciliation 
between the government and Muslim communities.  Furthermore, the situation 
necessitates that “recalcitrant wings of the MILF and the ASG must be dealt with 
militarily.  There is nothing to negotiate with these groups.”135  Secondly, the ability of 
the ASG members who conducted the attack to remain unidentified by the Muslim 
community indicates religious loyalty which can only be explained by a continued 
disaffection with the Philippine government.  The only way to win the trust of those 
individuals who silently consent to atrocities out of hopelessness or fear is through the 
good governance and civic reconstruction of conflict affected areas.  “Poverty and social 
injustice” which create opportunities for terrorists must be replaced with programs 
enhancing “access to basic needs, economic development, educational opportunities, and  
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infrastructure rehabilitation.”136  Humanitarian efforts which will eventually bring 
promise to communities and redistribute Muslim loyalties to those groups dedicated to 
improving lives. 
D. THE PHILIPPINES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 
1. Al Qaeda 
The Philippines has been exploited by terrorists groups in the past to include the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, Abu Nidal, Tamil Tigers, and Hamas.  None of these 
previous actors, however, achieved the levels of integration and success realized by the 
Al Qaeda network, which has developed a complex and comprehensive operational 
presence in the Philippines.  According to area expert Zachary Abuza, the Philippines 
was “thoroughly penetrated” by Al Qaeda, becoming a regional hub for recruitment, 
sanctuary, training, front companies, charities, money laundering, planning, and 
attacks.137  Al Qaeda was able to unite several groups who were focused on the 
realization of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia.  The united front recently demonstrated 
vulnerabilities.  Since September 11, the MILF has publicly distanced itself from 
terrorist-type activities in pursuit of a peaceful reconciliation with the GRP while the 
ASG continues collaboration and operations with regional terrorist activity. 
a. Al Qaeda and the MILF 
The degree of interaction between Al Qaeda and the MILF remains highly 
controversial.  Zachary Abuza insists that “links” between the MILF and Al Qaeda were 
“highly established.”138  Abuza offers examples of MILF interaction with Mohammed 
Jamal Khalifa as evidence of Al Qaeda connections, as well as intelligence reports of 
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“heavy bearded men wearing turbans” discovered in MILF camps.139  Other analysts 
recognize that “direct contact to Al Qaeda may have existed, but doubt that these were 
“sustained links” or evidence of “operational cooperation.”140  While these two points of 
view suggest a fundamentally different relationship between the MILF and Al Qaeda, 
agreement exists that a connection between the two groups was established as a result of 
Bin Laden’s interest in the region.   
As with so many Muslim organizations, the fight between the Afghani 
mujahidin and the Soviet Union was a call to arms and the MILF was no exception.  
Some 500-700 MILF fighters traveled to join the mujahidin in their efforts.  MILF 
candidates for the jihad were carefully selected for their leadership potential and 
prospective contribution in the Moro effort upon returning.  The benefits gained by 
fighting alongside the Afghan mujahidin cannot be underestimated.  MILF fighters were 
exposed to high intensity combat against a well disciplined enemy, trained in the use of 
explosives and bomb making, and developed skill sets for both guerilla and urban 
combat.141  Sending troops to assist the mujahidin became exceedingly expensive, and 
financial support was found from Osama Bin Laden who had established Al Qaeda in 
1988.142   
The association between the MILF and Bin Laden grew out of this 
connection. Bin Laden, already aware that the secular MNLF had abandoned the hope of 
jihad and agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government, recognized MILF 
commitment to building an Islamic state and deemed the organization worthy of Al 
Qaeda’s time, effort, and resources.  In order to best support the MILF, the decision was 
made to permanently establish a presence in the Philippines which would also act as a 
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regional base of operations.  Al Qaeda’s initial operative, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, 
created a network of Islamic charities throughout the Philippines which were initially 
utilized to build schools, mosques, and orphanages as well as provide food and shelter to 
war-torn areas.  Khalifa was a respected member of the community who participated on 
several influential boards of directors and was instrumental in gaining Saudi support for 
his “charitable” work.   
The goodwill generated by Khalifa’s charity eventually translated into 
financial and training support for MILF operations.  The MILF desperately needed the 
economic resources available through Al Qaeda.  While it maintained several legitimate 
businesses to generate revenue, the MILF lost its largest source of foreign funding when 
Libya cut support during the 1990s.  As a longtime supporter of Moro insurgents, Libya 
was conflicted when MNLF leaders signed the same autonomy agreement with the GRP 
that the MILF rejected.  Libya’s decision to cut its support for the Moros left the MILF 
desperate for a sponsor.  Al Qaeda responded in kind, soliciting its vast resources and 
common devotion to the Islamist struggle. 
MILF capabilities grew tremendously following Al Qaeda’s commitment 
to Southeast Asia.  Training was no longer limited to those who were sent to the Middle 
East terrorist camps.  Instead, the MILF benefited from the arrival of Middle Eastern 
trainers in its own camps.  The scenario introduced another generation of Moro 
insurgents to hardened mujahidin fighters who not only improved MILF tactical 
capabilities, but nurtured their spiritual connection to the broader Islamic revival.   
Al Qaeda recognized their relationship with the MILF as more than an 
occasion to further separatist efforts in the Philippines.  The MILF had the infrastructure 
Al Qaeda required to pursue the much more ambitious effort of uniting Islamic 
fundamentalists from around Southeast Asia.  Al Qaeda’s leadership created an 
opportunity to spread knowledge, and secure MILF bases provided a secure setting for 
regional networking.  Furthermore, the Philippine government lacked the capacity to 
prevent terrorist collaboration as evidenced by its inability to quell its Moro insurgency.   
The situation provided an enabling environment built upon weak borders, sympathetic  
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locals, and an overwhelmed domestic army. As a result, Al Qaeda provided the incentive 
for the MILF, ASG, and JI to begin a closer association for training, fund raising, and 
joint operations. 
b. Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and ASG 
The Soviet War in Afghanistan provided the opportunity for the Abu 
Sayyaf Group to create linkages to Al Qaeda.  Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani emerged as the 
leader of another group of Philippine fundamentalists who traveled to Pakistan in the 
1980s in support of the Afghan war.  While alongside the mujahidin, Janjalani widely 
professed his intention to continue the jihad in the Philippines.  His personal friendship 
with Osama Bin Laden facilitated the effort, and Janjalani benefited from the same 
organization of Islamic charities that fed the MILF.  However, when expanding 
operations in Southeast Asia, Bin Laden keyed on ASG support due to the MILF’s 
preference for conventional guerilla warfare over terrorism. 
ASG established its reputation as a small but exceedingly violent group, 
due in large part to the resources accessed through Al Qaeda.  ASG conducted series of 
domestic terrorist attacks during the early part of the 1990s, but fell into steady decline 
from 1995-2001.  The connection with Al Qaeda was exposed which seriously limited its 
access to funds.  ASG’s commitment to jihad gave way to a string of kidnappings.  
Between 2000 and 2001, the group accounted for “16 deaths and 140 hostage takings, but 
no acts of political-religious terrorism.”143   
In 2003, the kidnapping operations by ASG have stopped in favor of a 
series of bombing campaigns.  In March and April of that year, ASG members were 
implicated in an attack on the Davao airport and Sasa Warf which killed 48 people and 
wounded 204.144  In March 2004, ASG conducted their deadliest attack to date, killing 
more than 100 people in a bombing of a SuperFerry.  The sharp escalation in attacks and 
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fundamental shift in operations was credited to the resumption of funding, this time from 
Al Qaeda regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah.  Furthermore, the focus on areas outside 
Mindanao indicated ASG intent to achieve, “a larger, geo-political regional impact.”145 
ASG leadership had labored for inclusion to training in MILF camps but 
was excluded due to their “nonreligious and non-ideological” kidnappings.146  JI trainers 
who taught in MILF camps worked unsuccessfully to build a relationship between the 
MILF and ASG.  When an agreement could not be reached, JI instead began its own 
coordination with ASG members both in the Philippines and Indonesia.147  The renewed 
connection between JI and ASG subsequently turned into a triangular relationship to 
include the MILF, which maintained overall control of the southern Philippines.148  As 
number of counterterrorism operations and arrests have highlighted the degree of 
interoperability achieved by the three organizations.  Furthermore, “evidence suggests a 
cadre of first-generation Al Qaeda-trained JI leaders currently reside in Mindanao.”149  
The implication is that ASG and JI members, who do not control territory in Mindanao, 
receive protection from the MILF and have entered into an interdependent relationship 
with the MILF.  The ASG was able to secure JI the territory it needed to train and 
organize in return for inclusion to regional terror network and renewed ideology.  ASG 
has emerged from its gangster days of ransoming hostages as a “reliable partner” whose 
“radical interpretation of Islam meshes with Al Qaeda’s.”150 
2. The Impact of International Terrorists on the Peace Process 
Since the September 11 attacks, the MILF has come to view its relationship with 
Al Qaeda as more of a liability than a benefit.  Senior MILF officials downplay ties to Al 
Qaeda as a means of financing humanitarian or social projects through Islamic charities.  
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Instead of linking the future of the Moro people to Al Qaeda’s jihadist movement, the 
MILF evaluated political reconciliation with the GRP as a more effective means to 
achieve their objectives.  In essence, the MILF opted, at least publicly, for a political 
solution to its decades-long struggle against the Philippine government  
instead of choosing to continue its violent insurgency.151 
This is not to say that the MILF has completely severed ties with all extremist 
organizations.  Their connection with ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah remains a relationship 
of convenience and a hedge against the failure of the peace negotiations.  Overwhelming 
evidence indicates that ASG and JI operatives continue to train in MILF camps and enjoy 
the protection of MILF commanders.  Keeping JI and ASG around keeps AFP forces 
spread thin while at the same time providing MILF officials with “plausible deniability” 
when it does engage in terrorist activity.  The MILF have renounced terrorism and signed 
a cease fire with the GRP.  Permitting ASG and JI to remain operational in the southern 
Philippines grants the MILF a means to maintain its peaceful image, while at the same 
time employing ASG and JI operatives as a proxy for tactical engagements.152 
Abu Sayyaf continues to benefit from the technical expertise and financial 
resources available from Jemaah Islamiyah.153  It remains dedicated to a fully 
independent Moro nation, as well as a pan Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.  Should 
the MILF sign a peace agreement contrary to the terms of its hardliners, some members 
will simply pledge allegiance to Abu Sayyaf and continue the fight.154  Should either the 
MNLF-GRP peace agreement or MILF-GRP cease fire break down, continued ASG 
activity will benefit Moro negotiators by maintaining pressure on the thinly spread 
AFP.155  Thus, the viability of ASG as a spoiler for peace in the southern Philippines 
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remains a distinct reality.  As long as hope exists for continued violence against the 
Philippine government and its American ally, international and regional ties to terrorist 
organizations will persist. 
Serious consideration must be given to an Al Qaeda threat beyond both MILF and 
ASG circles.  The inroads created by Al Qaeda’s initial networking efforts in the 
Philippines remain in place, independently coordinating with individual and 
organizations throughout the region.156  Country characteristics that attracted Al Qaeda 
remain: ease of access, a sympathetic population, and corrupt officials, to name a few.  
These items require a considerable amount of time and effort toward institution building 
to correct.  The end result is an environment that will remain vulnerable to terrorist 
operations for an indefinite amount of time and a tenuous peace process that cannot 
sustain setbacks. 
3. Explaining Al Qaeda Intervention 
While the Moro struggle for independence influenced Al Qaeda’s decision to 
establish operations in the Philippines, several other reasons attracted international 
terrorists.  First, geographic orientation of the island nation allowed easy access.157  
Muslim areas in the south were well protected, providing a secure environment in which 
to recruit, train, and operate.  The vast number of islands allowed terrorists and weapons 
considerable freedom of movement.  The region harbored a number of Islamic 
movements vulnerable to Al Qaeda’s message, and operations in the Philippines provided 
the opportunity to bring together the various organizations for a united push for a pan 
Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.158  Political and economic instability of the 
Philippines also attracted Al Qaeda.  The government, army, and police forces were 
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riddled with corruption.159  The economic deprivation of conflict affected areas created 
Muslim populations desperate for acts of goodwill and charity, which Al Qaeda could 
exploit for its own ends.  Thus, on the surface Al Qaeda’s motivation in the Philippines 
would seem to be influence by Islamic solidarity, but in reality it simply needed a 
vulnerable area for money laundering, recruitment, and training.  Al Qaeda’s motivation 
was only in securing personnel, equipment, and territory to continue its fight against the 
West and its allies. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The international intervention in the Philippine conflict highlights not only its 
importance in the broader struggle against Islamic extremism, but the significant 
influence the Philippine conflict holds for Malaysia, the United States, and Al Qaeda.  In 
each case, intervention occurred as a means for each actor to achieve its own objectives. 
Malaysia’s facilitation of the peace negotiations came in response not only to 
MILF requests, but also the Philippine government’s request.  Therefore, both the MILF 
and the GRP must believe Kuala Lumpur offers at best preferential opportunity to fulfill 
its political agenda, and at worst will remain steadfastly neutral.  Malaysia has everything 
to gain in its participation.  Should negotiations fail, Malaysia can hardly be faulted.  
Peace has remained elusive since 1972, and a continuation of violence in today’s world 
of Islamic extremism would be no surprise to anyone.  Should negotiations succeed, 
several items of concern on Malaysia’s domestic agenda would be alleviated.  The 
situation for Malaysia could only improve. 
The United States continues its fight against Al Qaeda and its sympathizers with 
Philippine collaboration.  It has a vested interest in eliminating terrorist activity and the 
root causes of Islamic extremism which create political vulnerabilities.  Furthermore, its 
economic resources and international leadership provide the best guarantees for the 
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economic redevelopment of the war torn areas.  Both the MILF and the GRP benefit from 
the stability provided by American support of the peace process. 
Al Qaeda requires an area in which to train and organize.  Maintaining instability 
in the Philippines accomplishes this end, and the possibility of derailing the peace 
negotiations would be a celebrated success.  As such, it will continue its own operations 
in the Philippine attempting to support those Philippine organizations dedicated to 
terrorism and Islamic extremism.  Al Qaeda will maintain its foothold in the Philippines 
as a means of continuing its jihad against America its sympathizers within the Philippine 
government. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. INTERVENTIONIST MOTIVATIONS 
Instrumental motivations outweigh affective ones in each of the three parties 
examined.  While the actions of the United States were predictably founded in security 
and counterterrorism initiatives, the foundations of Malaysia’s regional policies were 
surprisingly similar in instrumental principles.  Even Al Qaeda, whose pursuit of an 
Islamic caliphate deceitfully lends itself to an affective categorization, seems more 
grounded in instrumental rather than affective stimuli. 
1. Malaysia 
Malaysian national interests are directly affected by the conflicts in both Thailand 
and the Philippines.  As a result, the complicated histories between Malaysia and each 
respective neighbor led to similar interventionist attempts in both conflicts.  As a leading 
Muslim nation in Southeast Asia and current chairman on the OIC, Malaysia offered to 
mediate negotiations between the governments of Manila and Bangkok and their 
separatist factions.  Manila accepted the offer and developed a framework for peace talks 
between the GRP and the MILF, while Thailand declined assistance and continues its 
purely domestic effort. 
Malaysian motivations seem to be intricately conflicted between instrumental and 
affective considerations.  Significant precedents of ethnic ties exist between Malaysia and 
Thailand, as well as between Malaysia and the Philippines.  As an influential Muslim 
nation and chairman on the OIC, Malaysian leaders feel they have a duty to protect the 
interests of Muslim groups globally.  Their actions draw considerable attention from 
other OIC member states.  At the same time, Malaysian politicians must balance concerns 
of immigration problems and anxieties regarding refugee flows from both conflicted 
areas.  Furthermore, the continued growth of Islamic fundamentalism is detrimental to 
regional security, forcing Malaysia to leverage concern for Thai and Philippine Muslim 
separatists with policies that discourage extremism and punish terrorists.  Sovereignty 
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disputes further complicate Malaysian bilateral relations with Thailand and the 
Philippines, which continue to influence the domestic considerations on each front.   
The convoluted and multi-layered issues in existence between Malaysia and 
Thailand and Malaysia and the Philippines beg the question of which loyalties most 
directly influence Kuala Lumpur policy makers in mediation attempts.  This thesis 
concludes that Malaysia’s primary incentives remain rooted in instrumental principles, to 
include ensuring their own security, controlling fundamentalism, and maintaining 
domestic stability.  Their concern for ethnic and religious brethren warrants mention as a 
component of Malaysian policies, but affective concerns are not equivalent in their value 
for Kuala Lumpur.  In fact, affective aspects are a source of concern to Malaysian leaders 
who fear affective ties between Thai Muslims and Malay Malaysians might facilitate the 
spread of extremism into Malaysia. 
In mediating peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF, Malaysian 
officials clearly stated that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines 
would be upheld.160  Thus, any support from Kuala Lumpur will be manifested in finding 
alternative solutions for MILF independence demands and structuring agreeable ways to 
address the root causes of Muslim unrest.  Kuala Lumpur’s approach was not developed 
to gain the diplomatic favor of Manila or out of neglect for the grievances sought by the 
Moro community.  Instead, the ability of Kuala Lumpur to address its own domestic 
issues while simultaneously alleviating the long standing injustices imposed on 
Philippine Muslims drive Malaysian motivation.  Successful intervention could 
realistically reduce the ability of terrorists to operate in the region, assist in the 
redevelopment and economic growth of the Southern Philippines, and thereby alleviate 
the immigration pressures on Sabah by Philippine Muslims.   
The literature predicted third party intervention would negatively affect prospects 
for peace.  In the case of the Philippines and Malaysia, just the opposite has occurred.  
The MILF were unwilling to negotiate without Malaysian mediation, which officials in 
Manila recognized and accepted as a necessary component of the peace process.  
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Preexisting conflicts between Manila and Kuala Lumpur were set aside in the interest of 
finding a durable solution to the Moro insurgency. 
The ability of Malaysian negotiators to find equally willing parties in Thailand 
remains doubtful.  Offers of assistance from Kuala Lumpur continue to be declined by 
Bangkok, whose status quo policies have failed to quell insurgent violence.  Then again, 
the identities of insurgent leadership remain unknown to officials in Thailand, and no 
demands have been forwarded by active extremist groups in the southern provinces.  
Thus, Bangkok cannot initiate dialogue with separatist leadership because those 
individuals remain unidentified.  
2. United States 
The primary interests of the United States rest unsurprisingly within instrumental 
guidelines.  Preventing a reoccurrence of the events of September 11, 2001, provides the 
fundamental impetus for decision makers in Washington.  When Southeast Asia became 
associated with Islamic extremism and Al Qaeda networking, strategic planners narrowed 
their focus on domestic Muslim insurgencies which international terrorists could exploit.   
Thailand, a historic ally of the United States, was an initially reluctant coalition 
member, but significantly increased willing participation when its own domestic 
insurgency reignited in 2004.  Bangkok’s democratic struggles, embodied by the 2006 
coup, impeded the continued material or financial assistance Washington might have 
offered against the Thai insurgents.  Furthermore, American participation against Thai 
insurgents could potentially escalate an already dire situation.  In the end, as long as 
Thailand’s insurgency remains domestic and insurgent activity maintains its distance 
from international terrorists, U.S. policy will not directly engage.  Washington needs Thai 
diplomatic backing for international counterterrorism policies and regional initiatives.  
The American military’s ability for continued use of Thai bases will remain the key point 
in relations between Washington and Bangkok.  Thailand continues to be a significant 
regional ally, and its continued support of American policies will allow bilateral relations 
to endure almost any domestic obstacles Bangkok faces. 
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In its significant history with the Philippines, Washington had long allowed 
Manila to address its Muslim unrest domestically with police and AFP forces.  With the 
onset of the War on Terror, Washington suddenly had a vested interest in bolstering the 
Philippine military’s capability to suppress Islamic extremism.  Thus, U.S. interests in the 
Philippines are ultimately rooted in security issues and counterterrorism policies.  
Nonetheless, Washington has agreed to support Manila’s strategy of peaceful 
reconciliation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  In doing so, Washington provides 
an increased capacity to address humanitarian concerns and economic development 
within the marginalized Muslim areas central to the conflict.  Having already lost 
credibility in the failed Tripoli Agreement, Manila’s ability to secure American financing 
and diplomatic support for a negotiated peace generates heightened potential for promise 
and growth.  Washington’s willingness to pursue separate military and humanitarian 
responses to factionalized Moro separatists could make the difference in finally resolving 
the conflict in the southern Philippines. 
3. International Terrorist Organizations 
Al Qaeda’s presence in Southeast Asia is well established.  Their operational 
reach has extended well into both Thailand and the Philippines.  The nature of Al 
Qaeda’s organization and underlying religious ideals seem to support an affective type of 
loyalty to Islamic separatist groups.  However, the religious and ethnic foundations of 
international terrorist organizations are still ultimately subordinate to instrumental factors 
of the conflicts.   
First and foremost, Al Qaeda’s interests rest with defeating the United States and 
its western allies.  In order to accomplish this task, they require a place to train, organize, 
equip, and recruit.  Southeast Asia, due mainly to its geographic orientation and 
historically destabilizing Islamic movements, provided an ideal setting in which to pursue 
its agenda.  Al Qaeda’s intention of assisting Southeast Asian separatists in their fight, 
therefore, was as much rooted in perpetuating an environment conducive to terrorist 
operations as in supporting Thai or Philippine Muslim grievances. 
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To date, Thai separatists have not taken advantage of the increased operational 
resources available from international terrorists.  Their current success in destabilizing 
southern Thailand and establishing primitive Muslim institutions has not seemed to 
require outside assistance.  Without a significant change from Bangkok in terms of 
counterterrorism initiatives or counterinsurgency operations, Thai separatists hardly need 
to change direction.  Keeping Al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations 
away would appear to benefit insurgent momentum by maintaining the low key, domestic 
character of the struggle. 
At different points in time, the two primary Philippine separatist organizations 
embraced assistance from international and regional terrorist organizations.  The MILF 
has subsequently distanced itself from such action in pursuit of a political solution, but 
ASG continues collaboration with Al Qaeda and JI and creates dramatic uncertainty for 
any peace processes.  Al Qaeda’s ability to blur loyalties between the MILF and ASG 
will feed doubts about a durable peace and weaken the already fragile hopes of the GRP.  
Should peace negotiations ultimately fail, the MILF and ASG are likely to benefit from 
the continued support and experience of hard line international terrorists, which is a 
scenario Al Qaeda will patiently await. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The predominance of instrumental interests among the diverse group of 
interveners studied has significant implications for Southeast Asia.  Most importantly, the 
alignment of extremists in one country with extremists in another is more likely to occur 
because of balance of power considerations as opposed to ethnic or cultural identity.161  
As a result, not all Islamic groups are susceptible to terrorist propaganda.  Most Southeast 
Asian extremist groups focus their own narrowly defined domestic objectives.  The 
extent to which these organizations ally or coordinate with other groups depends on the  
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degree of assistance received in return.  In essence, this is a cost-benefit analysis that 
depends on the return on the investment.  Each organization is ultimately concerned with 
its own limited objectives.   
Al Qaeda’s targeting of the Philippines occurred due to the enabling environment 
created by longstanding ethnic strife.  Al Qaeda did not assist Philippine Muslims 
because independence would improve their livelihood or hope for the future.  The 
terrorist network assisted Philippine separatists because an independent Mindanao would 
create an ideally located base of operations.  Furthermore, this strategy only worked 
because Philippine separatists were willing to accept Al Qaeda’s support.  In Thailand, 
separatists have not aligned with international terrorist organizations.  Philippine 
Muslims and Thai Muslims both seek independence, but chose different strategic 
alignments to get there.   
The divergent alignment decisions made by Philippine and Thai separatists 
brought about consequent decisions by the United States and Malaysia with regard to 
each conflict.  The United States intervened in the Philippines because Philippine 
separatists collaborated with the Al Qaeda network, and the United States refrained from 
intervening in Thailand because no evidence indicated Thai insurgents accepted 
international terrorist assistance.  U.S. counterterrorist policies responded to the Al Qaeda 
network as the primary security threat, and as such American military operations were 
limited to the Philippines. 
Malaysian problems with spillover and refugee flows were generated by the 
Philippine conflict only.  While threats of spillover from Thailand existed, no actual 
violence was generated on Malaysian soil as a result of the Thai insurgency.  Thus, 
Malaysia’s most immediate concerns were generated by the Philippine conflict.  When 
the opportunity to assume a central role in peace negotiations arose, Malaysian officials 
seized the opportunity.  By facilitating peace talks between the MILF and the GRP, 
Malaysia has the best prospect of improving its own domestic political agenda.   
The Philippines conflict became central to U.S. and Malaysian security objectives 
because of the Philippines’ strategic importance to international terrorists.  Each actor 
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was ultimately driven by instrumental motivations.  Accounting for the supremacy of 
instrumental objectives over affective obligations provides the international community a 
degree of predictability with complicated ethnic situations.  Counterterrorism operations 
can attempt to determine which extremist organizations are most vulnerable to 
exploitation by international terrorists, and then focus efforts on alleviating those 
fundamental vulnerabilities.  This strategy provides a framework to identify Islamic 
organizations inclined to accept outside assistance, and then develop a plan to prevent 
their co-optation by international terrorists. 
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